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Abstract: After independence, India and Lebanon attempted to manage their diverse societies 
through the framework of democratic states. Both countries deliberately eschewed the 
traditional nation-state model in which a mostly homogeneous and exclusively defined nation 
is represented by a state. Instead, Lebanon and India tried to create state-nations in which 
citizens with divergent ethnic, linguistic, and religious identities see themselves as part of the 
same political community through participation in a common state. Despite their attempts to 
democratically embrace diversity instead of imposing homogeneity, Lebanon and India 
followed vastly different paths in their political development. India’s democracy has proved 
remarkably resilient over the decades, becoming a rare democratic success in the developing 
world despite the country’s numerous ethnolinguistic and religious fault lines. Lebanon, 
which was for decades the Arab world’s only democracy, collapsed under the weight of 
sectarian tensions in 1975, leading to a civil war that lasted fifteen years. While its success in 
building a state-nation is qualified by its recurrent problems in Kashmir and the recent rise of 
Hindu nationalism, India has sustained democracy and avoided fragmentation and civil war 
for over seven decades. Lebanon, on the other hand, represents a markedly less successful 
attempt at building a state-nation due to its lack of national cohesion that has continued long 
after the end of the civil war. The explanation for both countries’ divergent trajectories lies in 
colonial legacies and political leadership, as well as institutional design choices that either 
fostered national unity or entrenched internal divisions. This thesis particularly seeks to 
underline the importance of creating a “we-feeling,” a sense of common belonging to a shared 
political community that coexists with citizens’ other salient identities, as a key factor in 
whether countries can build and maintain democracies in diverse societies.  
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Introduction: Democracy and Diversity 
 Given the rise of nationalism and the demands of imagined national communities to 
self-determination in independent states over the past century, can democracy work in diverse 
societies? To examine this question, this paper will compare the attempts of Lebanon and 
India to build cohesive democracies out of their heterogeneous populations. At first glance, 
this comparison might seem slightly bizarre. India is the second-most populous country on 
earth, while Lebanon is a small country both geographically and in terms of population: its 
territory covers roughly the same area as Connecticut, and its population only numbers four 
million.1 Yet both countries have long stood out as rare democracies in regions dominated by 
authoritarian regimes. Neither country has fallen under the control of an unelected dictator or 
experienced a military coup. Yet above all, both countries were expressly founded on the 
principle of pluralism, of unity in diversity. Lebanese and Indian pluralism stands in sharp 
contrast with the nation-state model, which is fundamentally exclusivist in its conception. To 
analyse the successes and failures of both countries, we could thus benefit from looking at 
them through a different conceptual framework: the state-nation. 
Before the beginning of the late modern period, multiethnic and multireligious states 
were prevalent throughout the world. The borders of multiethnic empires and kingdoms cut 
across boundaries between religious and linguistic communities—boundaries which were 
themselves rather fluid. With the American and French revolutions, however, the idea that the 
people of a nation are the ultimate source of political legitimacy spread throughout the world, 
leading national communities to imagine themselves into existence and demand self-
determination. The legacy of the French and American revolutions has left us with the 
normative vision that the international community is composed of nation-states, that is, states 
 
1 William Harris, Lebanon: A History, 600-2011 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 3. 
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claiming to represent a particular national community with a shared, homogeneous identity 
defined by politically salient cultural markers, be they linguistic, ethnic, or religious.2  
 The idea of nation-states—and nationalism itself—as Benedict Anderson 
demonstrated in his Imagined Communities, is a distinctly modern phenomenon that reflects a 
change in the direction of political legitimacy. Rather than traditional monarchical states 
where legitimacy is based on divine authority from above, the nation-state derives its 
legitimacy from below, claiming to represent the interests of the population, who are now 
citizens instead of subjects.3 This directional change in the source of state legitimacy 
produced two related but distinct phenomena—the spread of nationalism and the spread of 
democracy around the globe, as both nationalism and democracy are predicated on a common 
belief that the people are the ultimate source of political legitimacy. But who exactly are the 
people? 
Unlike an authoritarian system of government, democracy—that is, the rule of the 
demos, the people—depends on the consent and participation of the governed, and in this a 
common sense of community among the citizens of a democracy is essential. Several major 
theorists of democracy were thus quite sceptical about the wisdom or viability of democracy 
in diverse societies. In The Social Contract, Jean-Jacques Rousseau claimed that without a 
sense of common community, there could not be a “general will” of the people, only a 
collection of conflicting “particular wills.” As he wrote in The Social Contract, “when there 
are…partial associations at the expense of the [larger political community], the will of each of 
these association becomes general in relation to its members and particular in relation to the 
state…then there is no longer a general will, and the opinion that prevails is merely a 
particular opinion” of one of the constituent associations, and thus has no legitimacy in the 
 
2 Alfred Stepan, Juan Linz, Yogendra Yadav, “The Rise of ‘State-Nations,’” Journal of Democracy 21, no. 3 
(2010): 51. 
3 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: 
Verso, 2016), 7. 
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eyes of the minority communities whose desires are overlooked.4 It is for this reason that 
Rousseau was sceptical of the viability of a democratic system of government in anything 
other than an extremely homogeneous society.  
Rousseau’s logic was not entirely wrong: the past century has seen the fragmentation 
of large, multi-national states into smaller, more ethnically homogeneous states, often aided 
by ethnic cleansing. Starting with the First World War, multi-national empires, like the 
Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires, collapsed, producing a constellation of mostly 
ethnically homogeneous nation-states in their wake, many of which would undergo border 
changes and waves of ethnic cleansing during and after the Second World War (such as 
Czechoslovakia and Poland) and again after the fall of communist regimes at the end of the 
Cold War (like Yugoslavia). The tendency towards division is not unique to authoritarian 
states. The post-communist dissolution of Czechoslovakia, the secession of Bangladesh from 
Pakistan, and the decades-long Sri Lankan Civil War testify to the capacity of resentments 
between minorities and majorities to cause fragmentation despite a system of open, 
competitive elections. Even in prosperous, developed democracies like Canada, Spain, and 
Belgium, ethnic cleavages still threaten to cause political fragmentation, with separatist 
parties often in power in regions of all three countries. Clearly, then, diverse democracies 
have had difficulties in creating a common imagined political community accepted by enough 
of their citizens to hold the state together in the face of separatist nationalisms. 
Nation-states and state-nations 
 In their 2010 article “The Rise of State-Nations,” Alfred Stepan, Juan Linz, and 
Yogendra Yadav develop the idea of the state-nation to provide an alternative to the 
traditional nation-state model. They note that the basic assumption of the nation-state, that 
state borders line up with the boundaries of a homogeneous national community, often fails to 
 
4 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Du contrat social (Paris: Flammarion, 2001), 65. 
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describe the reality of political development in democratic states that lack the homogeneity of 
a country like Sweden or Japan, and that an alternative model is needed to look at democratic 
development in culturally diverse polities.5 They lay out a series of institutional and policy 
choices that they see as facilitating the survival of diverse democracies. This list includes the 
following elements: 
1. An asymmetrical federal state whose goal is “holding together” rather than “coming 
together” 
2. Simultaneous recognition of individual and collective rights 
3. A parliamentary rather than a presidential or semi-presidential government 
4. A political landscape composed of polity-wide and “centric-regional” parties 
5. Political integration without cultural assimilation 
6. Cultural nationalists in power instead of—and against—secessionist movements 
7. Overlapping, complementary identities instead of mutually exclusive identities6 
To clarify the differences between nation-states and state-nations, I have reproduced Stepan, 
Linz, and Yadav’s table comparing the two models below:7 
  
 
5 Stepan, Linz, and Yadav, “Rise,” 50. 
6 Alfred Stepan, Juan Linz, and Yogendra Yadav, Crafting State-Nations: India and Other Multinational 
Democracies (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011), 17-18. 
7 Stepan, Linz, and Yadav, “Rise,” 55. 
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 NATION-STATE STATE-NATION 
Pre-existing Conditions 
Sense of belonging 
or “we-ness” 
There is general attachment 
to one major cultural 
civilizational tradition. This 
cultural identity corresponds 
to existing state boundaries 
with minor exceptions. 
There is attachment to more than 
one cultural civilizational tradition 
within the existing boundaries. 
However, these attachments do not 
preclude identification with a 
common state. 
State Policy 
Cultural policies 
There are homogenizing 
attempts to foster one core 
cultural identity, particularly 
one official language. 
Multiplicity of cultures is not 
recognized. The goal is unity 
in oneness. 
There is recognition and support of 
more than one cultural identity (and 
more than one official language) 
within a frame of some common 
polity-wide symbols. The goal is 
unity in diversity. 
Institutions 
Territorial division 
of power 
The state is unitary or, if a 
federation, it is mononational 
and symmetrical.  
There is normally a federal system, 
and it is often asymmetrical. The 
state can be unitary if aggressive 
nation-state policies are not 
pursued and de facto 
multilingualism is accepted. 
Federacies are possible. 
Politics 
Ethnocultural or 
territorial cleavages 
Such splits are not too salient. 
Such splits are salient, but are 
recognized as such and 
democratically managed. 
Autonomist or 
secessionist parties 
Autonomist parties are 
normally not “coalitionable.” 
Secessionist parties are 
outlawed or marginalized in 
democratic electoral politics. 
Autonomist parties can govern in 
federal units and are 
“coalitionable” at the center. 
Nonviolent secessionist parties can 
sometimes participate in 
democratic political processes. 
Citizen Orientation 
Political identity 
Citizens feel that they belong 
to the state and to the same 
cultural nation at the same 
time. 
Many citizens have multiple but 
complementary identities. 
Obedience and 
loyalty 
Citizens believe in obedience 
to the state and loyalty to the 
nation. 
Citizens feel obedience to the state 
and identification with its 
institutions; none of this is based on 
a single national identity. 
Reprinted from Stepan, Linz, and Yadav (2010) 
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Beyond the state-nation, there is what Stepan, Linz, and Yadav refer to as pure 
multinationalism, which is a complete rejection of a state-nation characterised by little to no 
“we-feeling” and secessionist movements that lead almost ineluctably to fragmentation.8 
Although the state-nation is an ideal type that does not line up perfectly with any one case, 
they cite India as one of the most successful attempts to build a state-nation.  
While India and Lebanon are both candidates for being state-nations, this paper argues 
that India has been more successful than Lebanon in building a state-nation. Lebanon, by 
contrast, is more representative of a different, competing model of building diverse 
democracies: consociationalism.  
Consociational democracy: An alternative model 
 State-nation theory differs substantially from other proposed models to manage 
diversity within a democratic framework, including Arend Lijphart’s much-contested idea of 
consociational democracy. Lijphart’s consociationalism relies on four basic requirements:  
1. That elites can accommodate divergent interests within their communities, 
2. That elites can work together with elites of other communities across and "transcend 
cleavages,” 
3. That elites are committed to the maintenance and viability of the consociational 
system, and  
4. That elites are cognizant of the risks of fragmentation should the system break down.9 
There are several crucial differences between Lijphart’s consociational democracy and state-
nation theory. Consociational democracy is fundamentally about dynamics among elites of 
discrete communities. These elites are responsible for representing their communities in the 
state, meaning that the elites essentially mediate between citizens of their community and the 
 
8 Stepan, Linz, and Yadav, Crafting State-Nations, 11. 
9 Arend Lijphart, “Consociational Democracy,” World Politics 21, no. 2 (1969), 216. 
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state, creating a filter in the interactions of ordinary people with state institutions. The idea 
that communal elites are the fundamental players of the political landscape also suggests the 
absence of non-sectarian ideological parties that transcend communal cleavages. Lijphart is 
also silent on the question of a common national identity. At the level of the masses, the 
delegation of political authority to communal elites suggests that there is little sense of 
camaraderie and solidarity between members of different constituent communities, and thus 
little “we-feeling” acting as a glue to hold the various communities together. As for the 
communal elites, they in the interests of their own communities—not all citizens—and their 
cooperation is based on self-interest and the theoretically negative repercussions of defection 
rather than a sense of loyalty to the state. In other words, the “we-feeling” that is at the core of 
state-nation theory is entirely absent in the consociational model. For reasons that we will see 
later, Lijphart cites Lebanon as a prominent example of consociational democracy.  
Part I: Imagining a Nation: The Road to Independence 
India until 1947: Mass-based politics and the birth of a syncretic Indian nation 
Dismissing the notion that a unified state could ever emerge from the diverse peoples 
comprising Britain’s South Asian empire, Winston Churchill once claimed that India was 
merely “a geographical term. It is no more a united nation than the Equator.”10 This opinion 
was not confined to Churchill. Sir John Strachey, who served on the Governor-General’s 
Council in India, once asserted that “there is not, and never was an India, or even any country 
of India possessing, according to European ideas, any sort of unity, physical, political, social 
or religious.” Claiming that “Scotland is more like Spain than Bengal is like the Punjab,” he 
thought it impossible “that men of the Punjab, Bengal, the North-Western Provinces, and 
Madras should ever feel that they belong to one Indian nation.”11 These and other similar 
 
10 Winston Churchill, India: Speeches and an Introduction (London: Thornton Butterworth, 1931), 136. 
11 Quoted in Ramachandra Guha, India after Gandhi: The History of the World's Largest Democracy (London: 
Macmillan, 2007), 3. 
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arguments were not necessarily unfounded: India has a panoply of ethnolinguistic and 
religious groups that rivals (and might surpass in several ways) the diversity of the entire 
continent of Europe. In an age where homogenised nation-states were emerging from 
fragmented empires, it is no wonder that the British thought that Indian unity was a mirage.  
Ironically, however, Indian unity was a mirage that the British helped to turn into a 
concrete reality. Historians generally trace the beginnings of Indian nationalism to the 1885 
foundation of the Indian National Congress (INC), the party which would lead the Indian 
independence movement and govern India nearly without interruption for the first fifty years 
after independence. At its opening session, the INC stated explicitly that its goal was to 
“mould Indians into a common nation” and establish “the germ of a Native Parliament [that] 
if properly conducted, will constitute in a few years an unanswerable reply to the assertion 
that India is still unfit for any form of representative institution.”12 The INC was thus 
interested from the outset not only with creating pan-Indian political institutions—a 
foundation for eventual self-government and independence—but with turning Indians into a 
nation with a shared national identity, something which the word “mould” implicitly admits 
was not yet the case.  
For the first several decades of existence, however, the INC was led by a small, elite 
group drawn from the ranks of the anglicised upper-middle class seeking greater opportunities 
within the framework of the British state. In that sense, it was not a mass-based movement 
capable of creating some sort of national feeling extending out from the cities to the remotest 
villages and beyond a small, literate elite to the largely illiterate masses.13 Indeed, when mass 
protests erupted against the division of Bengal into two provinces by the British, the Congress 
leadership was caught flatfooted, its incremental, conciliatory approach called into question 
 
12 Proceedings of the Indian National Congress, ed. A.M. Zaidi (Delhi: Indian Institute of Applied Political 
Research, 1990), 1:39.  
13 Maya Jessica Tudor, The Promise of Power: The Origins of Democracy in India and Autocracy in Pakistan 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 55.  
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by the sudden radicalisation of nationalist feelings against the British.14 Resentment against 
the British continued to grow through the First World War, which caused massive tax and 
price increases and stirred up resentment against the British. The First World War also saw 
the return to India of a lawyer named Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi who had been 
perfecting his strategy of non-violent civil disobedience in South Africa and brought his 
methods back home to galvanise opposition to the British Raj. Gandhi spent the first three 
years after his return using civil disobedience as a method to force the British to redress local 
grievances until the passage of the Rowlatt Act in 1919, which extended emergency detention 
provisions introduced during the war that violated the principle of due process.15 The Rowlatt 
Act, along with the massacre by British soldiers of unarmed civilians at Jallianwala Bagh in 
1919 marked a turning point in his career, and he began to write and promote causes at an all-
India level.16 
Six years after his arrival in India, Gandhi had risen to become the leader of the Indian 
National Congress. Gandhi’s ascension to the leadership of Congress was fortuitous for the 
party’s attempts to forge a nation out of the people of India. From the very outset, those who 
wanted to mobilise an Indian people composed of the subcontinent’s myriad ethnolinguistic 
and religious groups faced a daunting challenge: forging a sense of unity out of masses who 
were not predisposed to build a shared sense of solidarity, much less see their histories and 
fates linked as part of an imagined Indian national community. To even stand a chance of 
successfully taking on the impressive state apparatus established by the British Raj, it was 
imperative to expand the nationalist movement beyond the small minority of educated, 
anglophone Indians to the peasantry.17 
 
14 Ibid., 53. 
15 Ramachandra Guha, Gandhi: The Years That Changed the World (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2018), 74. 
16 Tudor, 55.  
17 Partha Chatterjee, Empire and Nation: Selected Essays (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 48.  
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This reality reflected the impasse in which the Indian nationalist movement found 
itself. Previous rebellions against the British—including the famous 1857 revolt—were 
ultimately local affairs that only rarely crossed cultural and linguistic frontiers and never 
spread throughout the whole of British India. Because localised revolts and resistance were no 
match for the immense British state apparatus, they inevitably failed. The only group with the 
ability to communicate and organise on at an all-India level was a small anglophone 
community that was spread evenly—and thinly—throughout the subcontinent. Before Gandhi, 
as Sudipta Kaviraj notes, resistance “had little chance of attaining really threatening social 
depth or spatial spread.”18By simultaneously reaching masses across India and working with 
the nationalist elite of the INC, Gandhi managed to achieve social depth and spatial spread. 
Unlike the traditional nationalisms of Europe, the INC’s nationalism deliberately and 
explicitly cut across ethnic and religious lines. And through Gandhi’s various campaigns of 
civil disobedience—including the non-cooperation movement (1920), the Salt March (1930), 
and the Quit India movement (1942)—Gandhi mobilised average Indians throughout the 
subcontinent in movements which defined the interests of “Indians” against those of the 
British Raj based on a series of common, clearly defined principles.19  
Gandhi also successfully pushed for the reorganisation of regional Congress units 
along linguistic lines, regardless of whether or not such lines lined up with British territorial 
divisions. This reorganisation enabled a layering of complementary identities, allowing the 
embracement of one’s linguistic identity to exist simultaneously alongside loyalty to the 
nascent Indian nation and the Indian nationalist movement. As we will see, this set a powerful 
precedent for the post-independence Indian state.20 
 
18 Sudipta Kaviraj, The Imaginary Institution of India: Politics and Ideas (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2010), 111.  
19 Tudor, 82.  
20 Katherine Adeney, Federalism and Ethnic Conflict Regulation in India and Pakistan (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2007), 56. 
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Gandhi’s Indian nationalism was inherently pluralistic, seeking to include Indians 
regardless of religion, language, or caste. Gandhi’s form of Indian patriotism made him a 
national leader in the eyes of the nationalist elite while using a series of symbols, ideas, and 
reference points easily understandable to average Indians who otherwise have felt a sense of 
kinship or solidarity with people on the other end of the subcontinent. His emphasis on 
various principles, such as swadeshi, ahimsa, and satyagraha,21 resonated with wide swathes 
of Indian society and turned Gandhi into a sort of ascetic saint that had echoes throughout 
Indian history.22 Gandhi’s adoption of khadi (traditional hand-woven cloth) and his 
imposition of it on Congress cadres sent a powerful visual message. Gandhian khadi uniforms 
united Indians across linguistic lines and destroyed caste distinctions that were embedded in 
traditional clothing. As Jessica Tudor observes, through a narrative of clothing, Gandhi 
managed to create a “we-feeling” that was the basis of a pluralistic, egalitarian Indian 
nationalism.23 It was also a rejection of the economic powerlessness and the feeling of cultural 
inferiority familiar to all who lived under British rule.   
This Indian unity forged in opposition to the British underscores the irony of 
Churchill’s assertion that an Indian nation never existed: he is historically correct, but the very 
empire he championed was contributing to the birth of an Indian national consciousness. 
Those who wonder how Britain conquered a country as large and populous as India ask the 
wrong question because there was no sense of common Indian nationalism or identity to rally 
the entire subcontinent against increasing British power as region after region fell under 
colonial rule. The experience of colonialism—and resistance to it—was, in fact, necessary to 
 
21 Swadeshi refers to Gandhi’s boycott of European and manufactured goods and simultaneous promotion of 
cottage industries, especially in fabric production. Ahimsa is a principle of non-violence found in several 
dharmic religions that Gandhi made a fundamental part of his political philosophy, while satyagraha (“holding 
onto truth” in Sanskrit) refers to Gandhi’s version of non-violent resistance to unjust rule.  
22 Sunil Khilnani, The Idea of India (Gurgaon: Penguin Books, 2012), 165. 
23 Tudor, 80. 
12 
 
forge a national consciousness in India.24 Resistance to British rule was the cauldron in which 
an Indian national identity felt by village peasant and urban intellectual alike was forged.  
As Sunil Khilnani writes, Gandhi’s vision abandoned the traditional nationalist 
“discourse of history” and was defined by an “ambition for a self-producing community [that] 
was strongly moralizing…and dispensed entirely with the idea of a territorial nation state,” 
opting instead to unify Indians on the basis of religious morality.25 Indeed, in many ways, 
Gandhi’s anticolonial ideology amounts to a wholesale rejection of Western ideas of history, 
economics, rationality, and progress—a moment in colonial nationalist development that 
historian Partha Chatterjee calls the “moment of manoeuvre.”26 Yet many aspects of Gandhi’s 
ideology—his loathing of strong, centralised states and rejection of industrialisation—would 
be impractical (or disastrous) if implemented after independence. This brings us to 
Chatterjee's "moment of arrival" when nationalist discourses morph into a practical governing 
ideology. 
Jawaharlal Nehru, a close confidant of Gandhi who saw the Mahatma as a paternal 
figure, revered Gandhi as a moral figure but dismissed his ideas regarding the state, education, 
and economics. Modernisers like Nehru who wanted a progressive, industrialised India 
recognised that Gandhi connected with the masses with uncanny effectiveness, his 
problematic ideas notwithstanding. By allying with Gandhi, they gained power and influence 
that they would not have been able to obtain themselves, hoping to implement their agenda 
once independence had been achieved.27 With Gandhi’s support, Nehru rose to lead the INC 
and became India’s first prime minister after independence in 1947. Gandhi was assassinated 
in early 1948, which, while personally devastating for Nehru, gave him wide latitude to shape 
 
24 Kaviraj, 176-7. 
25 Khilnani, 165. 
26 Chatterjee, 48-52. 
27 Chatterjee, 55.  
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independent India as he wanted while benefiting from the lasting aura of his closeness to the 
martyred Mahatma.  
Gandhi rejected western notions of history, rationalism, and progress, and once 
claimed that “a nation is happy that has no history.” Nehru, by contrast, followed a more 
typical nationalist approach by imagining into existence an Indian nation through a historical 
narrative that stretched back and disappeared into the mists of time. Yet unlike other potent 
nationalist narratives that were sweeping the world at that time, Nehru’s narrative does not 
dwell on issues of purity, nor does his nationalism constitute an ideology of hatred against an 
out-group. On the contrary, the borders of Nehru's Indian nation are often very fluid. 
Throughout his career, he emphasised a version of Indian nationalism that emphasised the 
oneness of India while simultaneously recognising the diverse influences which had added 
their own contribution to the tapestry of Indian society. 
Published one year before independence, Nehru’s The Discovery of India has been 
described by many as a defining work in the history of Indian nationalism, one that created a 
powerful blueprint for India’s future by reaching far into its past.28 Nehru’s challenge was 
immense, as the people he wished to turn into Indians lacked one common defining 
“essence”. As Kaviraj notes, defining the borders of the British Indian state simply required 
looking at a map of regions under British control, regardless of the identities or loyalties of its 
inhabitants. By contrast, Nehru sought to build a nation with a shared “we-feeling” that would 
spread out and be internalised by people from the foothills of the Himalayas to the far 
southern tip of the subcontinent—a far more arduous task.29 Yet, as Nehru himself admitted, it 
was a necessary task, for nationalism represents “one of the most powerful urges that move a 
 
28 Kaviraj, 151. 
29 Ibid., 183.  
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people, and round it cluster sentiments and traditions and a sense of common living and 
common purpose.”30 
The Nehruvian nationalism that appears in The Discovery of India stands out from 
other nationalist narratives in its pluralism. The heroes of Indian history for Nehru are figures 
like the Mauryan emperor Ashoka or the Mughal emperor Akbar, who each stand out for their 
encouragement of religious tolerance and cultural syncretism. The antagonists of Nehru’s 
narrative are figures like Aurangzeb, the Mughal emperor who discriminated against Hindus 
and divided Indians against each other.31 In a particularly famous passage, Nehru outlines 
what he views as the overarching theme of Indian history, one of unity in diversity: 
Foreign influences were poured in and…were absorbed. Disruptive tendencies 
gave rise immediately to an attempt to find a synthesis. Some kind of a dream 
of unity has occupied the mind of India since the dawn of civilization. That 
unity was not conceived as something imposed from outside, a 
standardization…of beliefs. It was something deeper and, within its fold, the 
widest tolerance of belief and custom was practiced and every variety 
acknowledged and even encouraged.32 
 
Perhaps the most famous metaphor used by Nehru is that of the palimpsest, which, while a 
coherent and unified whole, bears the traces of multiple influences that made their own 
indelible contributions:  
She was like some ancient palimpsest on which layer upon layer of thought 
and reverie had been inscribed, and yet no succeeding layer had completely 
hidden or erased what had been written previously. All of these existed in our 
conscious or subconscious selves, though we may not have been aware of 
them, and they had gone to build up the complex and mysterious personality 
of India…Though outwardly there was diversity and infinite variety among 
our people, everywhere there was that tremendous impress of oneness, which 
had held all of us together for ages past, whatever political fate or misfortune 
had befallen us.33  
 
This, then, was not an essentialist nationalism like those that were reshaping the map of 
Europe. Nehru celebrated the ethnic, religious, and cultural diversity of India, but also made a 
 
30 Jawaharlal Nehru, The Discovery of India (New Delhi: Penguin, 2010), 44. 
31 Ibid., 286.  
32 Ibid., 55. 
33 Ibid., 51-2. 
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powerful argument that each of these components, while unique and special, together formed 
the tapestry of the Indian nation. In doing so, he articulated a powerful, coherent national 
identity that was nevertheless devoid of one specific, defining essence. Or, if the Indian nation 
did have an essence, it was its diversity and tendency towards tolerance and cultural 
syncretism. 
 This seemingly contradictory idea that India’s unity was its diversity established a 
grammar of politics that would be transitioned from the realm of national imagining to the 
concrete realm of state-building after independence. His reading of Indian history celebrated 
periods of Hindu-Muslim tolerance and cooperation as periods of great cultural and 
intellectual growth,34 and so Hindu-Muslim tolerance and cooperation became a fundamental 
tenet of his governing philosophy. Similarly, India’s linguistic communities, while each 
having its unique heritage, shared commonalities and links that underscored the idea of an 
India united in its diversity.35 As Khilnani notes, Nehru “relied on a compelling, if imaginary, 
story of the Indian past, told as a tale of cultural mixing and fusion, a civilizational tendency 
towards unification” that would enable him to make democracy and pluralism features of the 
Indian state after independence, for to not do so would be contrary to sprit of the Indian 
nation.36 
If Nehru recognised the power of nationalism to unite people and give them a sense of 
common identity and purpose, it was also a force capable of wreaking havoc. Looking at the 
example of European nationalism, he realised that the forms of narrow, exclusivist 
nationalisms that had caused two world wars in Europe would be disastrous if applied to 
India. Those nationalisms did not only depend on “a love of one's own country, but a hatred 
of all others. From this glorification of one's own patch of land and contemptuous running 
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down of others, trouble and friction between different countries were bound to result.”37 
Nehruvian nationalist discourse sought to rise above scapegoating and exclusivism, 
articulating a national identity defined by its pluralism and openness—a vision capable of 
holding together a subcontinent as ethnically and religiously diverse as India.  
By the time India approached independence in 1947, India had laid a solid foundation 
to build a state-nation. Unlike in many other countries emerging from the colonial period, 
nationalist sentiment had spread beyond a small intelligentsia and permeated even remote, 
impoverished, and largely illiterate corners of the Indian subcontinent. It is impossible to 
imagine that Indian national sentiment would have spread as widely and deeply into Indian 
society had it not been for the ultimately successful campaign led by the INC to force the 
British to withdraw from India. Through its outreach and mobilisation efforts, the INC had 
built political infrastructure that sprawled throughout the subcontinent. Not only did these 
efforts produce enough mobilisation that Britain, already in economic shambles after the 
Second World War, felt that it could no longer hold onto India, but it produced a sense of 
solidarity and commonality among the people who would be left behind when the British left. 
Even if Churchill was right that there was no Indian nation before the British came, there 
certainly was one when they left.  
Nehruvian pluralism was not the only nationalism gaining prominence in India at that 
time, however. Hindu nationalism posed a threat to Nehru and Gandhi’s vision both from 
within and outside of the INC. In the INC, certain figures, such as Bal Gangadhar Tilak, had 
called for the creation of “a mighty Hindu nation” and pined for the pre-Islamic era during 
which India was a “self-contained country.”38 Beyond the INC, groups like the Rashtriya 
Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) and the Hindu Mahasabha promoted an explicitly anti-Muslim 
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agenda. Hindu nationalists, such as prominent Hindu nationalist ideologue Vinayak Savarkar, 
claimed that those who had holy lands outside of India (that is, Muslims and Christians), were 
potential fifth columns because their loyalties, the argument went, could not fully lie with 
India.39 Other Hindu nationalists, like M.S. Golwalkar, called for Muslims to convert to 
Hinduism and adopt “Hindu culture and language” or accept subjugation to a Hindu 
majoritarian state in which they would not be equal citizens.40 The RSS also engaged in anti-
Muslim militancy in the hopes of sparking religious violence that would pit the Hindu 
majority against the Muslim minority.41 Fortunately, Hindu nationalists remained side-lined 
and were soundly defeated in the few elections that were held before independence. However, 
they did contribute to rising Hindu-Muslim violence as the British prepared to leave India. 
The assassination of Gandhi only months after independence by a former RSS member who 
deemed the Mahatma too sympathetic to Muslims gave now-Prime Minister Nehru an 
opportunity to outlaw the RSS.42 While Gandhi’s death temporarily strengthened Nehru and 
his vision for India, the conflict between Hindu nationalism and Nehruvian nationalism would 
carry on into the post-independence period. 
On the other end of the spectrum, a growing number of Muslims were embracing two-
nation theory, which claims that the Hindus and Muslims of the Indian subcontinent are two 
distinct nations and should each have independent states. Throughout the Second World War, 
increasing calls were made for the separation of Muslim-majority regions to form an 
independent state, led by the All-India Muslim League, which had become the most powerful 
opponent of the INC. After a series of communal clashes spurred on by the Muslim League 
that threatened to render India ungovernable and provoke a civil war, the INC reluctantly 
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acquiesced to partition of the subcontinent.43 Between one and two million people died in 
violence resulting from riots and massacres during partition and the ensuing flood of refugees 
going in both directions, with many Muslims trying to reach Pakistan and Hindus and Sikhs 
fleeing to India.44 The successful secession of Muslim-majority regions and the birth of 
Pakistan puts an asterisk above the INC’s success in leading India to independence. 
Nevertheless, it is important to appreciate what the INC did accomplish. By 1947, the 
idea of an Indian nation had been etched into the consciousness of citizens of the new Indian 
state through collective participation in the independence movement. While the independence 
movement did draw strength from grievances that were often local or economic, it channeled 
frustration into a movement that explicitly advanced the interests of an Indian nation that was 
defined as pluralistic and egalitarian. In so doing, the independence movement had 
successfully created an Indian national consciousness that crossed ethnic/religious cleavages 
and, crucially, did not conflict with Indians’ other various religious or ethnic identities, but 
complemented them.45  
Lebanon until 1943: A contested and hollow nation 
 Modern Lebanon was born from sectarian conflict. In May 1860, Maronite Catholic46 
peasants revolted against Druze47 feudal lords in the southern portion of Mount Lebanon. 
Although the Maronites were far more numerous than the Druze, they were routed by the 
stronger Druze forces and massacred in the thousands.48 Eager to expand its influence in the 
Middle East and position itself as a defender of Catholics and Christians more generally in the 
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Ottoman Empire, France intervened militarily to put an end to the conflict and forced the 
Ottoman Empire, which had become increasingly feeble, to reconsider the political status of 
Mount Lebanon. The result was the creation of a semi-autonomous region (mutasarrifiya) in 
Mount Lebanon. Notably, the mutasarrifiya did not include major (and Muslim-majority) 
coastal port cities like  Beirut, Sidon, and Tripoli. Seeking to establish an equilibrium between 
the various sects living in Mount Lebanon, the mutasarrifiya introduced a system known as 
confessionalism—the apportionment of government positions to members of various religious 
communities to ensure equitable representation and give smaller groups a stake in the 
preservation of the system. Under the mutasarrifiya, the Ottoman-appointed governor was 
advised by a council comprised of four Maronites, three Druze, two Greek Orthodox, one 
Greek Catholic, one Sunni, and one Shi’a. 49 Thus, starting from the very inception of modern 
Lebanon as a political entity, sectarian cleavages were recognised not only as very salient but 
as likely to cause conflict, and a system of fixed proportional representation was put in place 
to regulate sectarian tensions.  
Lebanists, who were (mainly Christian) thinkers arguing in favour of an independent 
Lebanon, began to articulate several different historical narratives to justify the existence of a 
Lebanese nation. In one popular version that gained traction in the last years of the Ottoman 
Empire and the early years of the French mandate claimed that Lebanon was often a refuge 
for minorities (including all of the Christian factions, the Druze, and the Shi'a) seeking refuge 
in the overwhelmingly Sunni Levant. This vision became popular even though successive 
Sunni empires had no difficulties in asserting their control over Mount Lebanon and it was 
more supported by the geographic concentration of minority communities in the mountains of 
Lebanon than any historical evidence of Sunni persecution.50 In other nationalist imaginings, 
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the semi-autonomous 1667-1841 Mount Lebanon iltizam (tax concession) controlled first by 
the Druze Ma’an family and later the Chehabs, a Sunni family that eventually converted to 
Maronite Catholicism, was transformed into a quasi-independent “emirate” and proto-state for 
modern Lebanon, despite the complete lack of evidence for a Lebanese national 
consciousness at that time.51 Many Lebanists went further back in time, claiming that 
Lebanon was, in fact, the successor of the Phoenician merchant city-states that lined 
Lebanon’s coast in classical antiquity. In this fanciful history, when the coasts were Arabised 
after the Islamic conquests, the essence of Phoenicia withdrew into Mount Lebanon, remained 
dormant for centuries, and re-emerged as a modern Lebanon that would restore the 
Phoenicians’ Mediterranean outlook and turn its back on the Syrian interior. 52 Many 
Lebanese Christians began claiming that modern Lebanese were ethnically Phoenician instead 
of Arab, despite speaking the same dialect of Arabic as their Muslim compatriots. The fact 
that Lebanese Christians spoke a version of Arabic descended from the Arabic of the Qur’an 
became a sensitive issue for them, and some Christians adopted French as their first language 
instead of Arabic to emphasise their desire to be a part of the Christian West instead of the 
Arab-Islamic Middle East.53 
The Phoenician narrative was greeted with derision by Muslims, who (quite rightly) 
saw in a Phoenician identity an attempt to detach Lebanon from the Arab and Islamic worlds 
and to link it to the Christian West. The very idea of Lebanon, they argued, was based on 
distortion and fabrication of history and a deliberate denial on the part of Christians of their 
Arab cultural and linguistic ties. Maronite Lebanists, however, were not the only group 
playing fast and loose with historical reality to create a narrative beneficial to their sect. Many 
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Syrian nationalists,54 including the founder of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, Antoun 
Sa'adeh, were Greek Orthodox. For opponents of Syrian nationalism, Greek Orthodox 
advocacy for a greater Syria was not coincidental. A greater Syria would have the advantage 
of uniting the Greek Orthodox, who are more numerous than Maronites in the Levant as a 
whole but geographically dispersed. A larger Syrian state with a nominally secular identity 
would maximise Greek Orthodox influence while diluting the salience of the religious identity 
of the Sunni majority with a cultural-regional Levantine identity. It thus not surprising that 
many historians critical of Syrian nationalism, such as Kamal Salibi, say that Syrian 
nationalism’s secular façade masks a form of “Greek Orthodox particularism.”55 Similarly, 
although some major Arab nationalist thinkers, such as Michel Aflaq, were Christians, 
Christian Lebanists accused Sunni Arab nationalists of hiding a sectarian plan to leave the 
Middle Easts’ minorities at the mercy of the region’s overwhelming Sunni majority in any 
large Arab state. Indeed, despite their claims to be secularists seeking unity for a 
linguistically-defined Arab nation, many Sunni Arab nationalists were hiding sectarian 
motives under a veneer of linguistic nationalism.56 
  The First World War brought about the fall of the Ottoman Empire, which had 
unwisely aligned itself with Germany and Austria-Hungary. At the same time, the Maronites' 
ally, France, emerged victorious and occupied what is now Syria and Lebanon. Instead of a 
small autonomous region within the Ottoman Empire, Maronites began looking at expanding 
Lebanon with French help. Led by the head of the Maronite Church, Patriarch al-Huwayyik, 
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many prominent Maronites successfully pressed France to expand the borders of the 
mutasarrifiya to include ports and interior lands left out of the original autonomous region. 
The result was that whereas Christians were an 80% majority in the mutasarrifiya (Maronites 
alone were 58%), in an expanded “Greater Lebanon”, they were only 55% of the population 
(Maronites were still the largest single group, but only with a mere 33% of the population).57 
The annexed Muslim-majority areas included the port cities of Beirut, Sidon, and Tripoli, as 
well as the fertile Beqaa Valley. The incorporation of these regions would make Lebanon a 
more viable state—the mutasarrifiya lacked a major port city and had little agricultural land—
at the expense of creating new Lebanese citizens who rejected the very idea of Lebanon.  
The French-created Greater Lebanon was legitimised internationally by the League of 
Nations’ decision to award France a mandate for Lebanon and Syria in 1923. Lebanon was 
now on track to be permanently separated from the rest of Syria and become an independent 
state at the end of the mandate period—a fait accompli that angered Arab nationalists who 
wanted to integrate Arabic-speaking Lebanon into a larger Arab state. Most of the Muslims 
drawn unwillingly into the borders of an expanded Lebanon denounced an independent 
Greater Lebanon as a naked power grab on the part of Maronites with no historical 
legitimacy.58  
In 1926, Lebanon adopted a constitution, which still forms the basis for Lebanon’s 
present political system. The constitution is a contradictory document that calls for a secular 
state while enshrining sectarianism. Many parts of the constitution are what one would expect 
from a secular democracy, with guarantees of complete equality before the law, freedom of 
expression and belief, and equal civil and political rights. Yet the 1926 constitution also 
requires an equitable representation of all communities in state institutions—effectively 
enshrining political confessionalism—without detailing a specific apportionment of positions.  
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Since most Muslims still rejected the existence of Lebanon as a state and a nation, many 
Christians saw promising them a share of power as necessary to convince Muslims to accept 
an independent Lebanon instead of undermining it.59 Confessionalism, then, was a tool used 
to obtain buy-in from minorities that did not necessarily have any loyalty to the state.  
One of Lebanism’s most eloquent proponents, the politician and journalist Michel 
Chiha, wrote in defence of confessionalism, asserting that    
Confessionalism is a guarantee of equitable political and social 
representation for associated confessional minorities… Lebanon is made of 
associated confessional minorities… it has always been a refuge for the 
liberty of conscience. This has been possible due to the geographical 
situation of Lebanon, a mountainous country where self-defence has always 
been possible… Why would we want to brutally modify what successive 
centuries have created? Despite many errors and abuses, it is 
confessionalism that taught Lebanon the value of tolerance.60 
 
Chiha conceived of Lebanon as a mosaic of minority communities that would tolerate each 
other and let each other live freely and in peace because of a common experience of being 
minorities clinging onto their faiths in an overwhelmingly Sunni region under successive 
Sunni empires, an idea based in the “refuge for minorities” previously discussed.  
Yet a coalition of “associated confessional minorities” does not constitute a nation. 
Chiha’s narrative only serves to highlight the fact that Lebanon could only survive through a 
convergence of interests among various religious communities that, although geographically 
and culturally proximate, considered themselves distinct from one another. There was no 
imagined Lebanese nation, no deeply-felt Lebanese national sentiment waiting to be realised 
in the form of a state after independence. To the extent that imagined communities did exist in 
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Lebanon, they were not coterminous with the borders of the Lebanese state. They either were 
restricted to one’s religious community within Lebanon or extended past Lebanon’s borders 
to all of Greater Syria or the Arabic-speaking world. Lebanon was thus from the beginning a 
nation of fragments with little glue holding them together instead of a cohesive nation.  
As the Lebanese historian Kamal Salibi acerbically notes, religious sects in Lebanon 
function as tribes, “and the game that came to be played between them was a tribal game. At 
an overt level, the game was a contest between different concepts of nationality for the 
country. At the covert level, tribal rivalries and jealousies were mainly involved.”61 In this 
tribal game, building a winning coalition required reconciling different—and mutually 
contradictory—nationalisms when, in fragmented society without a clear majority group, no 
one sect was strong enough to impose its own national vision on other communities. At the 
level of the state, it also meant working out a power-sharing agreement in order to give all 
sides a stake in the system—an approach that echoes Lijphart's consociationalism. 
The Lebanese independence movement, far from creating a national consciousness 
through mass mobilisation and a coherent ideological vision, was a more haphazard affair 
orchestrated by a small group of wealthy politicians and businessmen. In 1935, the French 
colonial government awarded a tobacco monopoly to a French company, which posed a 
mortal threat to the many Maronite tobacco farmers. Additionally, it irritated the Maronite 
Church, which had large landholdings used for tobacco cultivation. Seeing an opportunity to 
drive a wedge between the Maronite business elite and France, Riad el-Solh, a prominent 
Sunni politician from Tripoli allied with a leading Maronite politician, Bechara el-Khoury, to 
oust the French high commissioner who had approved the monopoly. In addition to bringing 
politicians together from across sectarian lines, the monopoly also sparked massive protests 
across Lebanon that momentarily united Lebanese regardless of sect against the British. It is 
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for this reason that the tobacco monopoly protests are considered a defining moment of 
Lebanese unity in Lebanese historiography.62 
The tobacco monopoly highlighted divisions between Maronite politicians like 
Khoury, who prioritised a propitious environment for Maronite businesses above the 
protection afforded to Maronites by France, and his bête noire, Émile Eddé, who sought to 
maintain close ties with France.63 While both Eddé and Khoury wanted to see a Maronite-
dominated Lebanon, they disagreed about how this goal could best be accomplished. Khoury 
favoured a Grand Liban, that is, a Greater Lebanon with a narrow Christian majority but more 
ports and agricultural land, while Eddé preferred a smaller Petit Liban that would jettison all 
of the lands added to the original mutasarrifiya with the exception of Beirut. While Eddé 
slowly became reconciled to the idea of a Grand Liban, he was pushing for the return of the 
Sunni-majority northern port city of Tripoli into the early 1930s.64 Crucially, the tobacco 
monopoly brought about a change in tone from some leading figures who had made common 
cause with Muslims during the protests. Khoury and Maronite Patriarch Antoine Arida both 
began to speak more favourably about the idea that Lebanon is part of a larger Arab cultural 
sphere.65 Khoury went so far as to say he wanted Arabic to be Lebanon’s “national language,” 
which broke with the Gallicisation of other Maronites who were trying to cut their ties with a 
language inextricably linked to Islam.66  
Solh saw in the gap between Khoury and Eddé—and between many Maronites and 
France—a chance to eject France from Lebanon, even at the price of acquiescing to an 
independent Lebanon in its 1920 borders, something that went against his Arab nationalism.67 
A pragmatist, he had not given up on the idea of Lebanon being subsumed into a larger Arab 
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state, but simply thought that Arab nationalism would best be served by a tactical 
rapprochement between Muslim Arab nationalists and Christian Lebanese nationalists to 
expel France from Lebanon. Additionally, a Grand Liban with a narrow Christian majority 
was far preferable to an overwhelmingly Christian Petit Liban supported by France which 
would forever be lost to the cause of Arabism. As Kazim el-Solh, a cousin of Riad, once 
remarked, Lebanon as a “political concept” did no long-term damage to the pan-Arab 
“national concept.” Compromise with Christians would achieve the important first step of 
forcing France out of Lebanon and allow Arab nationalists to wait for a more opportune time 
to pursue Arab unity.68  
In 1943, against the backdrop of the Free French promising Lebanon independence in 
the near future, Khoury and Solh once more joined forces for strategic purposes. With a new 
president to be elected by parliament in September after parliamentary elections in August, 
Khoury was looking for allies to secure the country’s highest office for himself. He could not 
count on the support of deputies from the Christian heartland in Mount Lebanon, where his 
allies had garnered less support than Eddé’s allies during the parliamentary elections.69 
Khoury and Solh came to a comprehensive, although unwritten and hence uncodified, 
agreement that became known as the National Pact (al-mithaq al-watani) that became the 
basis for Christian-Muslim cooperation in post-independence Lebanon—a topic to which we 
will return in the next section. More immediately, however, the National Pact paved the way 
for Khoury to win the presidential election on 21 September 1943. Khoury immediately 
appointed Solh as prime minister.70 Khoury and Solh demanded the French delegate-general 
turn over control of customs, railways, and ports to Lebanese forces and moved to delete 
provisions giving the French mandatory authorities from intervening in Lebanese politics 
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from the constitution. The delegate-general responded by arresting both men and several other 
leading politicians and appointing Eddé as acting president. This sparked massive protests, 
and the British—on whom the Free French authorities were dependent, as France was still 
under Nazi occupation—threatened to take control themselves unless the French relented. The 
French misread the situation, and instead of using Eddé to legitimate their actions, they ended 
up tarnishing Eddé while Maronites and Sunnis rallied together against the French. On 21 
November, Khoury and Solh were released and restored to their positions. Although French 
troops would only fully withdraw in 1946, Lebanon effectively became independent in 
November 1943. 
On the surface, the compromise between Khoury and Solh—Christian acceptance of 
an Arab-oriented Lebanon in exchange for Muslim recognition of Lebanese independence—
seemed to augur well for the future stability of Lebanon. Yet the rapprochement was 
superficial. As previously noted, Khoury and Eddé both sought to establish a Maronite-
dominated state and did not care for Arab nationalism. Their only disagreement was on how 
large Lebanon should be and whether French external support or bringing in Sunnis as junior 
partners in the state was the most effective way to achieve that aim. Similarly, the strategic 
acceptance of Lebanon by Solh and other Sunni Arab nationalist politicians was not a 
renunciation of their eventual goal to dissolve Lebanon into a larger Arab (and Sunni-
majority) state. In the short run, they had achieved their goal of turning the Maronites against 
their erstwhile French allies. Now all they had to do was wait for an opportune moment as the 
tide of Arab nationalism began to rise and sweep across the region. Lebanon might have 
achieved independence based on Christian-Muslim cooperation, but there was fundamentally 
no “we-feeling” holding them together. Lebanon existed as a state, but it did not exist as a 
nation. 
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Conclusion: Vastly different foundations 
 By the time Lebanon and India reached independence and became states, their state 
identities were framed in terms of pluralism. Although we are not yet, before independence, at 
the point where we can analyse elements of state-nation theory such as state policy, 
institutions, and the landscape of political parties, there are important observations to be made 
in the category of pre-existing conditions and citizen orientation.  
 In a state-nation, “there is attachment to more than one cultural civilizational tradition 
within the existing boundaries. However, these attachments do not preclude identification 
with a common state…[and] many citizens have multiple but complementary identities.”71 In 
India, this was already the case. Through the Indian independence movement, the INC had 
brought linguistic groups as disparate as Punjabis, Tamils, and Bengalis together and made 
them feel that they had a stake in the Indian nation. Crucially, however, their ethnolinguistic 
identity served to complement loyalty to the Indian nation and thus to the Indian state that the 
INC was inheriting from the British. Although the creation of Pakistan represented an 
enormous failure for the INC’s vision, figures like Nehru and Gandhi stressed that Muslims 
had a place in India, and a large proportion of Muslims chose to remain behind in India even 
after partition. Nehru stressed that Muslims were not only fully Indians but had made 
immense contributions to Indian culture and society. The same could be said of India’s 
myriad ethnolinguistic groups, each of which was, in Nehru’s eyes, unique while forming an 
inextricable part of the larger Indian nation. Congress had even recognised this in its 
organisational structure by organising the party internally along linguistic lines, thus allowing 
Indians to embrace their regional ethnolinguistic identity while simultaneously participating 
in the political life of the larger Indian nation. Through the common experience of struggle 
against the British which forged a national consciousness, along with the pluralistic 
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nationalism of Nehru and the INC, India managed to build a sense of national unity that was 
based on a layering of identities that complemented each other rather than contradicting each 
other.  
 In Lebanon, on the other hand, the loyalty of many Lebanese citizens to Arab 
nationalism or Syrian nationalism precluded them from identifying with the Lebanese state or 
even viewing its existence as legitimate. And while many Muslims and Arab nationalists 
ended up accepting the Lebanese state—which was a fait accompli in any case—this did not 
mean that they accepted and internalised the idea of a Lebanese nation. Additionally, the 
creation of Lebanon was blatantly a French-facilitated power grab on the part of Maronites to 
absorb as much economically lucrative territory as possible while ensuring Lebanon had a 
Christian majority, enabling them to maximise their political and economic power. The 
Maronites were not alone in this game, however, as members of other religious 
communities—such as the Sunnis and the Greek Orthodox—were also pushing national 
visions (Syrian/Levantine nationalism, Arab nationalism) that would maximise economic and 
political power of their sect. The only difference is that the Maronites got their way because 
of a powerful foreign sponsor. Already, a trend which would become a defining feature of 
post-independence Lebanese politics was becoming clear: an incapacity or unwillingness to 
think beyond the narrow interests of one’s own religious community. Such a reality was 
tacitly conceded by Chiha when he spoke of Lebanon as being made up of “associated 
confessional minorities.” The word “associated” implies that while they had agreed to 
cooperate, they did not fundamentally see themselves as members of the same community, 
with a common identity and shared destiny. In a sense, then, the only deeply ingrained 
imagined communities in Lebanon were religious communities, and one’s religious affiliation 
acted as a filter that largely determined how one perceived the legitimacy of the Lebanese 
state and the idea of a Lebanese nation. The idea of Lebanon as a state and as a nation was 
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thus compromised from the moment of its inception, as large numbers of Lebanese citizens 
viewed Lebanon as little more than an illegitimate Maronite ploy that would never have 
succeeded were it not for the Maronites’ collaboration with French colonialism.  
Lebanon also lacked a party like the INC, a shared experience to forge a national 
consciousness like the various pan-India movements against the British Raj, and a truly 
national figure like Gandhi to lead it to independence. Instead, the alliance between 
Lebanon’s minorities that ultimately expelled France from Lebanon was an alliance of 
convenience between elites: Sunni elites wanting European withdrawal from Lebanon and the 
Middle East and Maronite elites looking for economic freedom and opportunities in a way 
that was not possible under French rule. There was thus no shared ideological vision guiding 
Lebanon’s leaders at independence, nor did they have a desire to look out for the interests of 
all Lebanese citizens instead of what materially benefited their sect. While India’s constituent 
communities had a sense of national unity and common purpose, such was not at all the case 
in Lebanon. This difference explains why from the very moment of independence, India—
despite being far larger and far more diverse than Lebanon—was better positioned to build 
and consolidate a democratic state-nation.     
Part II: Building a State, Building a Nation: Post-Independence Trajectories 
India 1947-1970: State-nation building and democratic consolidation 
 India’s democratic success is one of the enduring mysteries of political science. In 
many respects, India’s democratic survival was not at all likely given the experiences of other 
countries with similar conditions. Indeed, in the other ethnolinguistically and religiously 
diverse states established in the wake of British withdrawal from South Asia, fragmentation 
and democratic collapse was the norm, rather than the exception. Pakistan’s two wings split 
apart after a bloody civil war in 1971 that followed Pakistan’s first general elections, which 
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were defined by ethnolinguistic tensions between Pakistan’s two wings.72 Sri Lanka’s own 
civil war, while not resulting in fragmentation due to the Sri Lankan military’s brutal crushing 
of the Tamil secessionist movement in the north of the island, showed the dangers of deep 
ethnolinguistic and religious cleavages that can become political cleavages as well. While 
avoiding the military coups that plagued Pakistan, Sri Lanka demonstrated how even a 
nominally democratic system of government can produce an illiberal outcome, in this case 
with the country’s Sinhalese majority marginalising the Tamil minority.73 Not only did India 
avoid the civil wars that tore its neighbours apart, but it managed to do so as a liberal 
democracy. 
 India’s democratic success after independence defied the common trend of democracy 
failing in impoverished, underdeveloped countries. Indeed, India is a glaring exception to the 
theories of political scientists including Adam Przeworski et al., who predict low levels of 
democratic survival in poor countries,74 Barrington Moore, who claims that democracy is 
dependent on industrialisation and a large bourgeoisie,75 and Seymour Lipset, who sees 
democracy as the result of development under authoritarianism.76 India’s democratic 
experiment, then, defied odds that went far beyond the heterogeneity of its population.  
India’s democratic consolidation is inextricable from its success as a state nation. 
Already, we have seen that India came into independence with unique advantages: a broad-
based national party with appeal across religious and ethnolinguistic divides, as well as 
among the elite and the masses, a shared national experience in resisting British colonial rule, 
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and a charismatic leader that held together the party’s broad coalition. Yet the advantages that 
India enjoyed at independence could easily have been squandered. As Anderson reminds us, 
nations are not objective entities—they are entirely subjective, imagined communities that 
exist so long as people believe that they exist, and nothing guaranteed that Indians would 
continue to feel Indian after independence. India had managed to unite against a colonial 
power that had now left, and behind a man who died months after independence. What was to 
prevent the coalition Gandhi had built from splintering apart, and the idea of a united India 
with it?  
Maintaining the unity of India was perhaps the most vexing challenge facing India’s 
first generation of post-independence leaders. Nevertheless, the Indian state managed to 
solidify the sense of Indian nationhood established before independence through a series of 
policy choices that turned India into a state-nation. We will first look at these choices in the 
context of religion and caste during the drafting of the Indian constitution before turning our 
attention to the thorny question of national language and state reorganisation, which remained 
contentious long after the constitution was in place.  
Religion, caste, and the drafting of the Indian constitution 
Perhaps nowhere were these choices more critical than in the crafting of India’s 
constitution. Constitutions are, at their core, technical documents that serve as the legal basis 
of a political entity, outlining rights, duties, and the internal structures of a state. Yet 
constitutions also fill a second, equally vital role as a statement of the values and ideals of the 
people that the state claims to represent. India’s constitution enshrined in the structure of the 
Indian state the liberal, pluralistic, and democratic values that Nehru saw as inherent to the 
Indian nation. It was a fulfilment in the concrete power of the state of the abstract visions of 
Nehruvian nationalism. Between December 1946 and December 1949, the Indian Constituent 
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Assembly set about drafting a constitution that recognised the diversity of India while seeking 
to preserve the national unity created during the independence movement. 
The process of writing the Indian constitution was one that was defined more by 
compromise and collaboration rather than narrow majoritarianism, in keeping with the ethos 
of the INC, which held the vast majority of seats in the assembly. The chairman of the 
drafting committee, the Dalit rights advocate and politician B.R. Ambedkar, was not a 
member of the INC and was even an outspoken critic of Gandhi. The constitution that 
emerged at the end of 1949 granted protections, rights, and a degree of autonomy for India’s 
ethnolinguistic and religious minorities while seeking to incorporate Dalits, who had long 
been ostracised under India’s caste system, into the Indian nation.   
Unlike Gandhi, who rejected the modern state entirely, Nehru and other INC leaders 
saw participation in the Indian state as a way of solidifying the unity of India. As Khilnani 
observes, the state that came into being after 1947 was designed based on a  “model shaped 
by Nehru’s understanding of the Indian past: a model committed to protecting cultural and 
religious difference rather than imposing a uniform ‘Indianness’.”77 Varshney arrives at a 
similar conclusion, noting that the values of pluralism and tolerance that Nehru derived from 
his reading of Indian history became “the implicit idiom of Nehruvian politics,” guiding 
India’s founding generation of political leaders as they transformed the abstract Indian nation 
into the concrete institutions of the state.78  
In practice, this meant that while India was to be a parliamentary democracy where the 
majority ruled, majoritarianism was ruled out and politicians were expected to govern in the 
interests of all Indians. In one of his most famous speeches before the constituent assembly, 
the Objectives Resolution, noting the absence of Muslim League members who were 
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boycotting the assembly while agitating for the creation of Pakistan during the first year of the 
assembly’s existence, Nehru affirmed that  
there is a duty cast upon us and that is to bear the absentees in mind, to 
remember always that we are here not to function for one party or one group, 
but always to think of India as a whole and always to think of the welfare of 
the four hundred millions that comprise India…the time has come when we 
should, so far as we are capable of it, rise above our ordinary selves and party 
disputes and think of the great problem before us in the widest and most 
tolerant and most effective manner so that whatever we may produce should 
be worthy of India as a whole and should be such that the world should 
recognise that we have functioned, as we should have functioned, in this high 
adventure.79 
 
Nehru’s speech underscores his belief that while forming a government only requires a simple 
majority of seats in parliament, “a government so elected had to be responsible for the 
security and rights of all, especially those of the minorities,” as Varshney notes.80 This 
sentiment was echoed by his more conservative deputy prime minister, Vallabhbhai Patel, 
who encouraged Muslims in the constituent “it will be a misfortune, to this country if the 
majority does not realise its own responsibility.”81  
Nehruvian politics was thus a rejection of majoritarianism from the beginning, calling 
on politicians to look out for the interests of all Indians, not simply those with whom they 
shared the same ethnic, religious, or political affiliations. Nehru also argued that conciliation 
and compromise were essential to the well-being of India as a state and as a nation:  
I should like the House to consider that we are on the eve of revolutionary 
changes, revolutionary in every sense of the word…Therefore, let us not 
trouble ourselves too much about the petty details of what we do, those details 
will not survive for long, if they are achieved in conflict. What we achieve in 
unanimity, what we achieve by cooperation is likely to survive. What we gain 
here and there by conflict and by overbearing manners and by threats will not 
survive for long.82  
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Nehru’s recognition that the viability of India’s unprecedented political experiment depended 
on including those who were in the minority because, besides the fact that pluralism and 
inclusiveness are inherently good, minorities could threaten the unity of India, even if they 
had no chance of controlling it. As Nehru wrote in a private letter to a chief minister several 
years later, “a more insidious form of nationalism is the narrowness of mind that it develops 
within a country, when a majority thinks itself as the entire nation and in its attempt to absorb 
the minority actually separates them even more. We, in India, have to be particularly careful 
of this…We have a tendency to fall into separate groups and to forget the larger unity.”83 
Ambedkar echoed these statements, noting in his last speech before the constituent assembly 
that “political democracy cannot last unless there lies at the base of it…liberty, equality and 
fraternity as the principles of life…without equality, liberty would produce the supremacy of 
the few over the many…[and] without fraternity, liberty and equality could not become a 
natural course of things.”84 The ultimate success of India’s democratic experiment thus 
depended on its ability to create legal equality as well as a sense that all citizens belonged 
equally to the larger Indian national community. 
This realisation helps why the final constitution—written by an assembly with an 
overwhelming majority of Hindus who were still bitter from the loss of Pakistan—enshrined 
basic rights and freedoms, among them the right of all religious groups to openly practice 
their religions. Interestingly, the only instance in which the constitution interferes with 
internal religious affairs does not involve India’s Muslim minority, but rather its Hindu 
majority. The constitution authorises the state to allow all Hindus—including previously 
excluded Dalits—to enter Hindu religious institutions.85 Article 26 allows religious 
communities to manage their own internal religious affairs, including matters of inheritance 
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and marriage explain. Article 44, meanwhile, calls for the establishment of a secular civil 
code, although India has yet to make good on that commitment.86 The constitution’s preamble 
explicitly establishes the Indian state’s secularism while deliberately invoking the French 
republican motto of “liberty, equality, fraternity.”87 The constitution bans all discrimination, 
be it based on religion, caste, or gender and establishes the equality of all Indian citizens 
before the law.88  
 How to achieve such equality, however, was a vexing challenge. In an echo of what 
had happened with the establishment of Lebanese confessionalism, members of many 
minority groups, including Muslims and Dalits, demanded guaranteed reservations in 
legislatures and state institutions, as well as separate electorates in elections. The question of 
reservations was ultimately one of balancing the simultaneous need to promote social and 
economic justice and foster national unity. While reservations and separate electorates would 
have guaranteed minority representations, they would also have meant that politicians would 
only have to appeal to members of their own communities, rather than build coalitions across 
religious and caste divisions. Although most of the INC rejected the idea of separate 
electorates as contrary to the goal of creating Indian unity, many Muslims and Dalits viewed 
reservations as necessary to avoid oppression by caste Hindus. The creation of Pakistan 
resolved this question regarding Muslims as the Muslim League, which had pushed for 
reservations and separate electorates, disappeared from the Indian political scene. As 
Varshney notes, partition, while painful for the India and the INC, effectively removed the 
possibility that India would become a consociational democracy, effectively guaranteeing that 
India would have a liberal democratic regime based on secular citizenship.89 The Muslim 
representatives who remained in the constituent assembly after partition were largely opposed 
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to reservations and separate electorates. The only female Muslim assembly member, Begum 
Aizaz Rasul, dismissed them as “absolutely meaningless” and “a self-destructive weapon 
which separates the minorities from the majority for all time.” In a secular India which 
promised the equality of all citizens before the law without distinction, the interests of Hindus 
and Muslims would be the same and “the safety of the Muslims lies in intelligently playing 
their part and mixing themselves with the Hindus in public affairs.”90 The idea of reservations 
was also rejected for women.  
 Only two groups, Dalits and Adivasis,91 received reservations proportionate to their 
size of the population in parliament and state legislative assemblies. Nevertheless, the 
reserved seats were not elected by separate electorates but rather by all residents of a reserved 
constituency. Hence, Dalits and Adivasis were guaranteed representation while having to 
compete for votes from those outside their communities.92 It was an imperfect solution, but it 
balanced the need to force politicians to build broad coalitions while also starting to make 
amends for millennia of discrimination. Furthermore, Adivasis and Dalits received guaranteed 
posts in the civil service, even if this meant using lower standards to hire them.93 While 
eminently justifiable given the state’s commitment to promote social justice for all, the system 
of reservations in governmental institutions has had a deleterious effect on Indian unity. 
Reservations have served to promote a form of caste-based identity politics in which parties 
have, to a certain degree, become vehicles for various caste groups to push for reservations for 
their own communities. The state, then, has become a metaphorical pie, with castes fighting 
over the size of their slice rather than focusing on expanding the pie. Although they have 
significantly helped previously oppressed groups, reservations have accentuated the salience 
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of caste identities, ironically reducing inequality while perpetuating the sense of difference 
upon which that inequality was based.94  
The vexing question of language and linguistic states 
 Perhaps the most challenging question facing India’s leaders was the question of 
national language. Most nationalisms, as Anderson points out, draw their strength from 
uniting members of a given linguistic community.95 It is in part because of the presumption 
that language was the base of the political communities that John Stuart Mill, echoing 
Rousseau’s concerns about the problem of creating a “general will” in a fragmented society, 
claimed that democracy would be unfeasible in a linguistically diverse society. Mill wrote that 
“free institutions are next to impossible in a country made up of different nationalities. 
Among a people without fellow-feelings, especially if they read and speak different 
languages, the united public opinion necessary to the working of representative institutions 
cannot exist.”96 As Stepan, Linz, and Yadav point out, India’s success in holding together a 
linguistically diverse society—in defiance of Mill’s prediction—is one of its most remarkable 
achievements and at the core of its claim to be a state-nation.97 
 Mill’s theory, however, has been proven right more than it has been proven wrong 
historically. Europe, for instance, is largely democratic today, but its states have largely been 
linguistically homogenised through fragmentation and war. That India did not follow this path 
invites us to look at how India managed to avoid linguistic fragmentation.  
 There were many Indians—mostly from India’s 30% Hindi-speaking plurality98—who 
believed that, like European nationalists, a nation could not exist or survive without a 
 
94 Ashwini Deshpande, “Despite the Rhetoric, the 10% Reservation Bill Does Not Aim for a Caste-Free 
System,” The Wire, 10 January 2019. 
95 Anderson, 133-4. 
96 John Stuart Mill, Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, vol. 19, ed. J.M. Robson (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1977), 547.  
97 Stepan, Linz, and Yadav, Crafting State-Nations, 40. 
98 This figure is from Stepan, Linz, and Yadav, Crafting State-Nations, 40. 
39 
 
common language. In this vein, they argued for the imposition of Hindi as India’s official 
language. R.V. Dhulekar, a Hindi chauvinist in the constituent assembly from the United 
Provinces (today Uttar Pradesh), argued that 
people who do not know Hindustani99 have no right to stay in India. People 
who are present in this House to fashion a constitution for India and do not 
know Hindustani are not worthy to be members of this Assembly. They had 
better leave…As an Indian I appeal that we, who are out to win freedom for 
our country and are fighting for it should think and speak in our own 
language…As an Indian I feel that the proceedings of the House should be 
conducted in Hindustani.100 
   
It does not require much imagination to imagine how offensive these ideas were to the 
majority of Indians who did not speak Hindi as their mother tongue. Although figures like 
Dhulekar were a minority, most of the INC leadership favoured the establishment of 
Hindustani—a blend of Hindi and Urdu101—as India’s national language in the interests of 
promoting national unity, including Nehru and Gandhi.102 Although the INC’s promotion of 
Hindustani demonstrated the INC’s commitment to make Hindus and Muslims feel equally 
welcome in India, they failed to realise the backlash that would come from areas of the 
country where Hindi and Urdu were not the native language. In the end, however, the 
secession of Pakistan undermined the case for Hindustani and the centre of the debate moved 
to Hindi by itself.103 T.T. Krishnamachari, a Tamil-speaking member of the constituent 
assembly from Madras, a region where Hindi was effectively a foreign language, expressed 
the views of South India on the idea of Hindi as India’s sole national language, remarking that  
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if we are going to be compelled to learn Hindi…I would not be willing to do it 
because of the amount of constraint you put on me…I would, Sir, convey a 
warning on behalf of people of the South for the reason that there are already 
elements in South India who want separation…and my honourable friends in 
U. P. do not help us in any way by flogging their idea [of] ‘Hindi Imperialism’ 
to the maximum extent possible. Sir, it is up to my friends in U. P. to have a 
whole-India; it is up to them to have a Hindi-India. The choice is theirs.104  
 
Krishnamachari’s remarks underscore the fact that India could only survive as a state-
nation. If India had chosen to adopt the nation-state model of “one nation, one language,” it 
would have made it impossible for those who did not speak Hindi to continue identifying 
themselves as Indian. Rather than layering identities as in a state-nation, Indians would have 
to have been forced to choose between their linguistic identity and belonging to the Indian 
nation—a choice that would have been disastrous for the viability of a democratic, united 
India. Fortunately, politicians arrived at a temporary compromise through which English—
which, despite its association with colonialism, represented an ethnically neutral link language 
with global prominence—would join Hindi as a co-official language for a fifteen-year period 
until 1965, at the end of which the co-official status of English could potentially be renewed. 
Nehru died in 1964, one year before the expiration of English as a co-official language. His 
successor, Lal Bahadur Shastri, then had to deal with the thorny question of the future status 
of English. In the southern state of Tamil Nadu (formerly known as Madras), the Dravida 
Munnetra Kazhagam, a Tamil nationalist party that had only recently renounced Tamil 
secessionism, orchestrated protests that swept Tamil Nadu, with the burning of Hindi-
language books and the vandalism and removal of signs in Hindi. Clashes with police turned 
violent and a series of strikes and boycotts paralysed the state. Several suicides, in a couple of 
instances by self-immolation, also took place to protest the impending imposition of Hindi.105 
Faced with a crisis of governability in Tamil Nadu that was spreading to other non-Hindi 
speaking states, Shastri promised to respect Nehru’s pledge to allow English to remain co-
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official with Hindi as long as the people wanted to. English was thus permanently established 
as a co-official language at the federal level. Shasrti also guaranteed that states could continue 
to conduct business in any language of their choice and mandated that communications 
between states take place in English or have translations in English.106 An additional 
problem—the language of examination for the Union Public Service Commission exams—
was solved in 1967 with a decision that would allow aspiring civil servants to take exams in 
English or any official regional language. This arrangement effectively ensured that no one 
would be discriminated against in civil service hiring on account of his/her native language.107 
Twenty years after independence, the question of national language had finally been resolved, 
with a series of pluralistic state-nation policies prevailing over a narrow, exclusivist nation-
state model that would have forever alienated India’s non-Hindi speaking regions.  
 Equally critical to the success of India’s development as a state-nation during the 
Nehru years was the establishment of India’s system of linguistic federalism. India’s 
constitution included provisions to promote minority languages at the state level in the India’s 
tiered federal system. Article 29 forbids discrimination based on language while affirming the 
right of linguistic communities to preserve their languages and cultures.108 The constitution 
provides individual states the freedom to conduct business in whatever language they chose, 
guarantees the availability of primary education in minority languages, and affirms the right 
of citizens petition the state in any language they choose.109 The seventh schedule of the 
constitution, which defines the powers of the central government and the various state 
governments, gave states wide latitude to adopt their own policies in areas including 
economic and social planning, education, criminal law, and agriculture, empowering regional 
minority groups and preventing them from feeling that they were powerless colonies of the 
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central government in Delhi.110 Crucially, Articles 2 and 3 allow for the redrawing of state 
borders and the creation of new states.111 These constitutional guarantees were critical in 
obtaining buy-in from linguistic minorities who might have otherwise feared being part of a 
larger Indian state (and, by extension, Indian nation) in which their community only 
represented a small minority. 
 Although language is not listed explicitly as a justification to create new states and 
adjust the borders of existing states, the creation of linguistic states featured prominently in 
the deliberations of the constituent assembly. The constituent assembly created the Dar 
Commission to investigate the linguistic reorganisation of Indian states. In its 1948 report, the 
Dar Commission decided against advising the reorganisation of Indian states along linguistic 
lines, believing that it would not serve “the larger interests of the Indian nation,”112 despite 
previous INC support for the establishment of linguistic states and Gandhi’s internal 
reorganisation of INC regional units along linguistic lines.113 In 1949, the JVP report—named 
after the constituent assembly members who drafted it, Prime Minister Nehru, Deputy Prime 
Minister Vallabhbhai Patel, and Pattabhi Sitarmayya, all of whom belonged the INC—stated 
that while the INC did not oppose linguistic states in theory, the recent parititon of India and 
the threat of further fragmentation meant that consolidating the Indian state and Indian 
national unity should take precedence, which would require “stern discouragement of 
communalism, provincialism, and all other separatist and disruptive tendencies.” The JVP 
report proposed postponing the reorganisation of states while affirming that “if public 
sentiment is insistent and overwhelming, we, as democrats, have to submit to it.”114 Nehru 
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personally hoped that preserving multilingual states would promote interethnic harmony and 
cooperation.115 
 That public sentiment that the JVP report referenced, however, did not wait long to 
make itself heard. During the 1950s, the Indian political scene was shaken by a series of 
popular movements to create linguistically homogeneous states in Marathi-, Telugu-, and 
Punjabi-speaking regions.116 Aware that failing to proactively respond to the popular unrest 
could lead to the very fragmentation that they feared, Nehru and the INC leadership acceded 
to popular demands by establishing the States Reorganisation Commission in 1953 and 
creating a Telugu-speaking Andhra State from Tamil-majority Madras, as Telugu-speaking 
areas had been rocked by a series of riots after the death of a prominent Telugu member of the 
Indian independence movement who had been fasting to push the central government to 
create a separate Andhra State.117 Unlike in 1948, by 1953 India had already finished writing 
its constitution, integrated the various princely states that acted as vassals for the British 
during the colonial period, and held its first national elections. The INC leadership, with the 
wounds it suffered from the Pakistani débâcle no longer as fresh and its control more firmly 
established, was in a better position to allow for the reorganisation of states along linguistic 
lines when it looked like the Indian union was finally secure.118  
This is not to say that the process of reorganisation went smoothly. The country’s 
largest city, Bombay, witnessed an occasionally violent conflict between the city’s Marathi-
speaking plurality, which wanted to integrate the coastal city into a Marathi-speaking 
Maharashtra,  and the various minority language communities, which together comprised a 
majority of the population, that wanted to separate Bombay from the Marathi-speaking 
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interior. 119 The issue remained unresolved until 1960, at which point Bombay State was 
divided into a Guajarati-speaking Gujarat and Bombay became the capital of an 
overwhelmingly Marathi-speaking Maharashtra. Following reorganisation in both 
Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh (comprised of Andhra State and the Telugu-speaking areas 
of the former princely state of Hyderabad), the INC won landslide victories against regionalist 
parties despite the virulent anger which until recently had been directed towards Nehru and 
the INC.120  The creation of linguistic states, which allowed ethnolinguistic communities 
autonomy and provided a vehicle to express their identities, thus facilitated their integration 
into the larger Indian state-nation. With the creation of linguistic states, the aspirations of 
India’s various linguistic communities could be peaceably fulfilled within the framework of a 
layered federal state that mirrored the successful layering of Indian and regional identities.  
While the INC performed rather well in regional elections in Andhra Pradesh and 
Maharashtra after the reorganisation of states in the 1950s, the INC did not fare as well in 
Tamil-majority Madras State after the national language crisis of 1965. The bitterness in 
Madras was still so strong that the INC government in the state was defeated in a landslide in 
the 1967 state legislative assembly elections. The Tamil nationalist DMK won an 
overwhelming victory, defeating the INC chief minister, K. Kamaraj, who was also the 
national president of the party.121 The INC has never recovered in Tamil Nadu (Madras 
State’s name since 1969), although the party does sometimes play the role of kingmaker 
between the DMK and its main rival, the AIDMK, whose ideology is also based in Tamil 
regionalism. The decline of the INC in Tamil Nadu and the dominance of regional Tamil 
cultural-nationalist parties, however, actually underlines the success of India’s state-nation 
experiment. Regionalist parties like those in Tamil Nadu are today prevalent throughout India, 
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but secessionism is virtually non-existent and regional parties like those in Tamil Nadu 
routinely participate in forming parliamentary coalitions in the federal parliament.122 Rather 
than what happened in Sri Lanka, where Tamils took up arms against the state, secessionism 
is almost entirely absent among Indian Tamils, underlining the success of India’s state-nation 
policies that fostered layered, complementary identities through a system of linguistic 
federalism.123  
By the time of Nehru’s death in 1964, India had built up a state-nation that enshrined 
the pluralistic values of Nehruvian nationalism—such as religious and linguistic pluralism—
into the constitution and institutions of the Indian state. Although Nehru was sceptical about 
the wisdom of diving India internally along linguistic lines after the division of India during 
partition, the creation of linguistic states facilitated the layering of regional ethnolinguistic 
identities with a broader Indian supra-identity. Along with Nehru’s other great achievements 
as prime minister that contributed to the consolidation of Indian democracy—including the 
subordination of India’s military to civilian control and the routinisation of the rule of law, 
civil liberties, and fair and open elections—the realisation of the Indian state-nation provided 
the glue to peacefully hold India’s diverse ethnic and religious groups together within the 
framework of a liberal democratic political system. While there were unresolved problems—
chief among them the disputed region of Kashmir, which we will explore in the next 
section—it is difficult to deny the broad success of attempts to transform India into a state-
nation during Nehru’s tenure.  
The Indian independence movement had given Indians the beginnings of a shared 
political identity based on a nationalism that rejected exclusivism and embraced pluralism and 
tolerance. Nehru and his generation of post-independence leaders then took that nationalism 
and built it into the structure of the new Indian state, helping to solidify a common sense of 
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Indianness while respecting the other salient ethnolinguistic and religious identities of Indian 
citizens.  
Lebanon 1943-1975: An unstable house of cards 
Lebanon’s post-independence political trajectory has largely been shaped by the 
National Pact, the unwritten agreement established between the Maronite politician Bechara 
el-Khoury and the Sunni leader Riad el-Solh, Lebanon’s first post-independence president and 
prime minister, respectively. The National Pact attempted to resolve the disagreements 
concerning both the identity of Lebanon and to ensure that all of Lebanon’s constituent 
religious communities would accept and work within the Lebanese state. The National Pact 
solidified the system of confessionalism that had first originated under the Ottoman 
mutasarrifiya. Under the National Pact, the president and commander of the Army were to 
always be Maronites. The position of prime minister was reserved for Sunnis, while the 
speakership of parliament was reserved for Shi’a.124 The deputy prime minister and deputy 
speaker were to be Greek Orthodox and the position of chief of general staff could only be 
held by a Druze. Beyond high offices of state, seats in parliament were also divided on a 
confessional basis, with Christian deputies outnumbering Muslim deputies by a 6:5 ratio. The 
justification for these allocations was based in data from the 1932 census, which remains the 
last census to be carried in Lebanon.125 Crucially, no arrangements were made to modify seat 
allocations in the event of demographic shifts. The potential political repercussions of a new 
census for the confessional system explains why the 1932 census remains the most recent.   
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The National Pact also placed a bandage over the conflict between Lebanists and Arab 
nationalists, which, to echo Salibi, was ultimately a sectarian game between Lebanon’s 
various religious communities. Under the National Pact, Christians would agree that Lebanon 
would identify itself as an Arab country rather than a Western one, while Muslims would 
respect Lebanese independence and renounce attempts to reunify with the rest of Syria.126 As 
Khoury wrote in his memoirs, the National Pact represented “an agreement between two 
elements that compose the Lebanese nation to fuse their inclinations into one ideology: the 
final and complete independence of Lebanon without resorting to protection from the West or 
unity or federation with the East. ”127 Of course, as we have already seen, this narrative belies 
the reality of the situation. The National Pact was the result of a momentary convergence of 
interests between Christians looking for economic freedom and Muslims willing to work with 
Christians, even if it meant temporarily accepting Lebanon, to drive France out of the region. 
Having won Muslim acquiescence to a state in which Christians would control the lion’s 
share of power (via the presidency, command of the army, and a guaranteed parliamentary 
majority) based on a narrow majority in increasingly outdated census data, Lebanese 
Christians would firmly reject changes to the National Pact over the coming decades. The 
same cannot be said of Lebanon’s Muslims. While they had forced Christians to adopt an 
official Arab state identity, the dream of Arab unity remained unfulfilled. Nevertheless, with 
demographic changes over time, Muslim politicians were confident that they would 
eventually be able to renegotiate the National Pact in their favour or even seek unification 
with a larger pan-Arab state.128 A precarious island of Christian political power in an 
overwhelmingly Muslim Middle East, the Lebanese state was to face attempts to undermine it 
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from both outside and within its borders. The National Pact was not based on mutual 
agreement but rather resembled an agreement between uneasy partners in a coalition 
government. It was a programme that neither party fully agreed with and would not attempt to 
undermine at a later point, but both partners agreed to it for the sake of gaining power in the 
short term because each lacked the strength to impose its will on the other.  
Warning signs began to appear just over a decade after independence. In 1956, Israel, 
France, and Britain launched an invasion of part of Egypt to reassert Franco-British control of 
the Suez Canal, which had recently been nationalised by Egypt’s president, the Arab 
nationalist Gamal Abdel Nasser. During the Suez Crisis, the Maronite president, Camille 
Chamoun, refused to break off diplomatic ties with Britain and France. Given the blatant 
violation of the sovereignty of a fellow Arab nation by Western powers, Lebanese Muslims 
were outraged and accused Chamoun of reneging on their commitment to accept Lebanon as 
an Arab-affiliated country. The Sunni prime minister, the Arab nationalist Abdullah Yafi, 
resigned to protest Chamoun’s decision.129  The following year, Chamoun became the first 
(and only) Arab head of state to accept the Eisenhower Doctrine. Under the Eisenhower 
Doctrine, the United States would help any Middle Eastern state threatened by Communism. 
Muslims considered this to be an additional violation of the Christian commitment to avoid 
aligning Lebanon with the West.  
In 1958, Egypt and Syria merged to form the United Arab Republic (UAR), which 
they hoped would attract more Arab countries, leading to the ultimate goal of uniting Arabic 
speakers under one state. The creation of the UAR happened just as Chamoun was trying to 
illegally extend his presidency (Lebanese presidents can only serve one term of six years) 
with assistance from a parliament that was filled with his allies after he had gerrymandered 
many of his opponents out of their seats in the 1957 parliamentary elections. Armed 
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confrontations took place between Chamoun loyalists and Egyptian-armed opposition forces 
supported by most Sunni politicians and Kamal Jumblatt, an ambitious Druze politician. 
Almost all areas added to the mutasarrifiya to create Greater Lebanon fell to the opposition, 
reducing the areas controlled by the Lebanese state to the Maronite heartland of Mount 
Lebanon. Prudently, the Maronite army chief, Fuad Chehab, chose to keep the army out of the 
conflict in order to prevent the splintering of the army, which could have possibly been fatal 
for the Lebanese state. Invoking the Eisenhower Doctrine, Chamoun sought and obtained 
American military assistancer, resulting in the arrival of American troops to the country to 
restore order. The United States and the UAR reached an agreement under which the United 
States would force Chamoun to step down and the UAR would cease helping opposition 
forces. Chehab, who alone remained unsullied by the conflict, became the consensus 
candidate to succeed Chamoun as president.130 131  
Chehab’s tenure as president restored peace to Lebanon and protected the sovereignty 
of the Lebanese state. It also represented Lebanon’s best hope at escaping narrow sectarian 
politics, but that hope would ultimately be dashed by the end of his tenure. Chehab recognised 
the shortcomings of Lebanon’s confessional system. He also despised the zu’ama (singular 
za’im), the traditional politicians with quasi-feudal patronage networks who dominated 
Lebanon’s political scene, deeming them “corrupt, self-absorbed, and incapable of producing 
national integration.”132 Ironically, Chehab co-opted many of the country’s leading zu’ama 
from both sides of the 1958 conflict, including Jumblatt and Pierre Gemayel, a far-right 
Maronite za’im who had once openly expressed admiration for Hitler.133 He also appointed 
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Rashid Karami, an Arab nationalist who had been a prominent anti-Chamoun figure in 1958, 
as his prime minister and succeeded in establishing friendly relations with Nasser.134  
Chehab also reformed the Lebanese civil service, creating a system that would 
determine promotion and appointment based on merit and exams and mandating parity 
between Christians and Muslims. While Sunnis and Druze were fairly represented by the end 
of Chehab’s presidency in the civil service, Shi’a only occupied 4 of 115 senior posts, an 
abysmal number given their size of the population.135 Chehab also started an unprecedented 
series of public works projects and government programmes that aimed at helping 
underdeveloped regions that were often Shi’a-majority. Yet Chehab never sought to undertake 
structural changes like the abolition of confessionalism in parliament and high government 
positions. Chehab did, however, create a powerful security apparatus, the Deuxième Bureau, 
which he used to infiltrate the networks of the zu’ama to undermine their power.136 After a 
failed 1961 coup attempt, Chehab became particularly aggressive in his use of the Deuxième 
Bureau, which rallied the normally fractious zu’ama behind a common effort to undermine 
Chehab’s security apparatus. That effort succeeded with the one-vote victory of Suleiman 
Frangieh over the Chehabist candidate, Elias Sarkis, in the 1970 presidential election. Chehab 
also refused to create his own political party, thus depriving himself of a vehicle to further a 
form of reformist, non-sectarian politics that was absent from the Lebanese political landscape 
and ceding control of the political process to the zu’ama.  
Despite their mutual loathing, Lebanese zu’ama were similar in many regards. Almost 
all of them were ardent supporters of laissez-faire economics and saw an interventionist 
government with strong welfare programmes as a threat to their patronage networks that 
allowed them to act as go-betweens between members of their sects and the state. In keeping 
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the state debilitated and thus forcing ordinary Lebanese citizens to seek the help of political 
bosses from their own sect, the zu’ama created vertical social structures that polarised society 
along sectarian divides in order to preserve their own power and patronage networks.137  
While the zu’ama continued rotating in and out of cabinet positions at the top of the 
state, one of Lebanon’s largest and most disadvantaged communities, the Shi’a, began to 
make themselves heard. In the Shi’a-majority south, incomes were not even a fourth of what 
they were in Beirut by the middle of the twentieth century,138 and the share of doctors and 
medical facilities in Shi’a-majority areas were only a fourth of what they should have been 
proportional to these region’s share of the overall population.139 That Lebanon’s Shi’a were 
an afterthought economically for the central government was not entirely surprising. The 
National Pact fundamentally benefited the Maronites and brought the Sunnis in as junior 
partners. Yet unlike the Maronites and Sunnis, the Shi’a, as previously mentioned, were not 
even guaranteed a high office of state under the original 1943 agreement, only monopolising 
the speakership after 1947. They also did not see themselves represented in either of the main 
competing national identities in Lebanon. As Muslims, they were not inclined towards a 
quasi-Christian identity that looked towards Europe. Yet like the Christians, they were a 
minority community in an overwhelmingly Sunni region. Hence, as the Lebanese-American 
Shi’a scholar Fouad Ajami writes, Lebanese Shi’a did not identify with “a Maronite concept 
that stressed Lebanon's Christian identity [or with] a Sunni Arab conviction, upheld by the 
merchants of Beirut, Tripoli, and Sidon, that the country was a piece of a larger Arab world. 
Both conceptions were alien to the Shia.”140 An economically disadvantaged population that 
could not identify with existing political identities was bound to eventually represent a threat 
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to the established order, especially when that group, due to favourable birth rates and higher 
rates of Christian emigration, was on track to possibly become the single largest group in the 
country around the outbreak of civil war in 1975.141  
President Chehab, almost unique among non-Shi’a politicians in the post-
independence period, sought to integrate the Shi’a and improve their economic condition. The 
Chehab administration invested heavily in agricultural technology and irrigation in the Shi’a-
majority Beqaa Valley and the south. One of the unintended consequences of these 
investments was that increased efficiency reduced demand for labour, causing a mass exodus 
of Shi’a.142 Most moved to impoverished communities on the outskirts of Beirut that became 
known as the “belt of misery.”143 Adding to the problem, many Lebanese had to vote in the 
villages where their parents were born, effectively disenfranchising many of the Shi’a 
migrants who moved to Beirut.144 Economically and politically disadvantaged, the Shi’a 
began to look for an alternative to their own zu’ama who had failed to improve the condition 
of their communities.   
Into the gap left by traditional Shi’a zu’ama stepped Musa al-Sadr, an Iranian-born 
cleric of Lebanese origin who moved to Lebanon and began to build a network of charities 
and schools for the marginalised Shi’a. Foreshadowing what would happen during the 1979 
Islamic Revolution in Iran, Sadr politicised the symbols and stories of Shi’ism to rally his 
community behind a programme of economic and political change, deftly blending traditional 
conservative piety with leftist economic ideas.145  
Chehab in fact promoted Sadr during his presidency, appreciating his cross-sectarian 
social work and an anti-poverty campaign that he undertook with the Greek Orthodox 
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archbishop Grégoire Haddad. Sadr represented the possibility of a more socially minded, 
cross-sectarian politics that resonated with Chehab.146 To further his policies, Sadr established 
the Harakat al-Mahrumin, the Movement of the Disinherited, which would eventually form 
an armed wing, Amal, one year before the start of the civil war. Along with Hizballah, which 
emerged in the early 1980s with the help and assistance of the newly-established Islamic 
Republic of Iran, Amal became one of the two major Shi’a forces during the civil war, 
aligning itself with other anti-status quo forces against the Maronites.    
If the Shi’a represented an internal threat to Lebanon’s confessional regime, 
Palestinians constituted a threat simultaneously internal and external. Out of 700,000 
Palestinian refugees created by the establishment of Israel and the 1948 Arab-Israel War, 
130,000 fled into Lebanon, which at the time only had a population of around a million.147 If 
they were naturalised, the Palestinian refugees—who were overwhelmingly Sunni—would 
throw off the demographics underpinning the National Pact. The demographic problems that 
the Palestinians could cause for Lebanon’s brittle confessional democracy is the reason that 
they were never even given the right to apply for citizenship (unlike other countries, such as 
Jordan), or even work outside their refugee camps. While they were unarmed refugees 
isolated within camps, however, they posed little immediate threat to the system. That 
calculus, however, radically changed after 1967.  
The Six-Day War of 1967 resulted in the decimation of Egyptian, Syrian, and 
Jordanian forces. In under a week, Israel seized the Sinai Peninsula as well as the two last 
pieces of colonial Palestine under Arab control, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The 
stunning degree to which the Arab armies had been routed caused a major attitude shift 
among Palestinian refugees, who lost faith in other Arab countries to defeat Israel and allow 
them to return home. Instead, they would have to personally take the fight to Israel.  
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One year after the débâcle of the Six-Day War, Palestinian militants began to carry out 
raids into Israel from Lebanese territory. After the successful hijacking of an Israeli passenger 
plane, the Israelis responded by destroying Lebanese planes at the Beirut airport.148 Realising 
that the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) risked dragging Lebanon into a conflict 
with Israel. In 1969, the Lebanese Army tried to contain the PLO, resulting in clashes in 
Beirut, Tripoli, and Sidon. In response, Rashid Karami, the Sunni za’im who was serving as 
prime minister, resigned to protest the crackdown on the Palestinians.149 Faced with weak 
security forces and Sunni zu’ama who were lining up behind the PLO, President Helou had no 
choice but to sign the Cairo Agreement, under which the PLO had the freedom to control 
Palestinian camps and the Lebanese Army was obligated to facilitate PLO movement to the 
Israeli border, from where it could infiltrate Israeli territory. To save face, the Cairo 
Agreement also affirmed the increasingly farcical notion of Lebanese sovereignty.150 
The Cairo Agreement served to radicalise Christians, pushing them into the arms of 
right-wing, anti-Palestinian figures like Gemayel. Israeli airstrikes in southern Lebanon 
caused another wave of Shi’a to leave the south for Beirut, and Sadr condemned the 
government for its inaction. Jumblatt, as interior minister in the cabinet, legalised several 
banned Arab nationalist, leftist, and Syrian nationalist groups that had previously been banned 
to weaken the Christians’ position even more.151 
By the end of 1970, Lebanon had become the centre of PLO operations against Israel. 
Earlier that year, factions of the PLO in Jordan called for the overthrow of the Jordanian 
monarchy and tried to assassinate King Hussein. In retaliation, the Jordanian military cracked 
down on the PLO, expelling all of their forces from Jordan during a mini-civil war that 
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became known as Black September.152 Syria, not wanting to be the next Jordan, also refused 
to let the PLO continue operations from Syria, but was happy to facilitate the entry of PLO 
fighters into Lebanon.  
This pattern continued for several more years, with Israeli raids targeting the PLO, 
clashes between Lebanese army forces and factions of the PLO, and even the kidnapping of 
Pierre Gemayel’s son, Bashir, by Palestinian fighters. As William Harris acerbically notes, 
“most Maronites could not fathom what any of this had to do with confronting Israel.”153 At 
the same time, the weakening of Chehab’s security services by President Frangieh after his 
election in 1970 weakened the Lebanese state’s ability to respond even more.154 As Frangieh 
urged Christians to arm themselves, Sadr concluded an alliance with the Sunni zu’ama and the 
PLO against the Maronites.155 After a failed assassination attempt against Gemayel on 13 
April 1975 and the massacre of a bus full of Palestinian civilians by militiamen loyal to him in 
retaliation, the Lebanese civil war began, causing a breakdown of state authority that would 
last one and a half decades.  
Just over three decades after independence, Lebanon’s confessional democracy had 
gone up in flames. On the surface, the basic narrative is easy enough to follow: Christians 
who wanted to crack down on the Palestinians were unable to because of Sunni politicians 
who instrumentalised the PLO and Palestinian civilians to further their own interests, and the 
system broke apart as a result.156 Yet as Michael Hudson reminds us, the truly important 
question is not how the Palestinian presence in Lebanon caused the Lebanese Civil War, but 
rather how there was such a large Palestinian presence in the country at all.157   
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The answer to this question lies in Lebanon’s failure to build a coherent united 
national identity to united its constituent parts. As Raghid El-Solh notes, "the pressures 
exerted by Zionism and Palestinian nationalism forced Lebanon on numerous occasions to 
choose between being a part of the Arab world or standing outside it. To be ‘less Arab' could 
be taken to imply being ‘non-Arab', which could, in turn, create serious problems for 
Lebanon.”158 In other words, the Palestinian question called the bluff that both sides had made 
with the National Pact. While Christians theoretically accepted Lebanon as an Arab state, they 
were not willing to materially help or participate in the defining Arab cause of the century. 
And although Muslims—particularly the Sunnis—pledged to uphold the principle of a 
sovereign, independent Lebanon, they ultimately facilitated the undermining of Lebanese 
sovereignty, causing political gridlock and allowing a foreign entity to wage war with another 
foreign entity from Lebanese soil. 
As before independence, each sect was manoeuvring to maximise its own power. 
Unfortunately for the Christians, their expanded Greater Lebanon ultimately had too many 
Muslims for them to hold on to the lion’s share of political power indefinitely, and they had 
no option but to create militias to defend their increasingly precarious hold on power. 
Conveniently for the Sunni zu’ama who no longer wanted to be play the role of junior 
partners in a Maronite-led Lebanon, the Palestinian presence in Lebanon gave them the 
military capacity to take on the Maronites while affirming their Arab credentials. The 
Palestinians offered them, in a sense, a chance to finally realise what they had first attempted 
in 1958: the destruction of a Christian-led Lebanon. The Shi’a, economically and politically 
marginalised while increasingly demographically strong, represented a sleeping giant with no 
interest in preserving the Lebanese system. The same could be said for Druze like Kamal 
Jumblatt, who aspired to become president but could not under the National Pact because of 
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his religion. Yet while all the calculations of each sect are logical alone, they are only logical 
if one is pursuing greater power and influence for one’s sect, rather than looking out for the 
interests of all Lebanese citizens. Clearly, then, the vision of building a common Lebanese 
identity had failed, and the only identities that inspired any loyalty were sectarian.  
As the current speaker of parliament, Nabih Berri, notes, the Lebanese “behave like 
tribes instead of like people of one country. The 1943 Pact that we created is a partitionist 
pact. It helped make us build a farm, not a country.”159 Lebanon existed as a state on paper. In 
the minds of its citizens, however, there was little sense of commonality, as reflected by the 
fact that such a precise power-sharing arrangement had to be but in place from the beginning. 
While the Lebanese system did require politicians to work across sectarian lines and tried to 
give each religious community a stake in the government, it also froze those very sectarian 
divisions into place. The system of sectarian apportionment of parliamentary seats and 
government posts encouraged Lebanese to see themselves as members of their religious 
communities, as Halim Barakat and others have quite rightly pointed out.160 In pushing 
Lebanon over the precipice while promoting the interests of their own sects, the Lebanese 
zu’ama demonstrated that a pluralistic, inclusive Lebanese identity—which theoretically 
coexisted alongside citizens’ sectarian affiliations—was nothing more than a chimera.  
Conclusion: Different starting points, different paths 
On the surface, Lebanon and India attempted to realise a similar goal: the 
establishment of a pluralistic, democratic state that would bind the different communities of 
the country together. Both states had constitutions which guaranteed freedom of expression 
and belief, and both held regular elections that, while not immune from chicanery, were 
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generally fair and resulted in the relatively peaceful transfer of power. So how did their paths 
diverge so sharply? 
The first answer goes back to the colonial period and how the Lebanese and Indian 
states came into existence. The INC started out as a fundamentally elite-led organisation. 
Over time, however, it managed to mobilise the masses (except Muslims agitating for the 
creation of Pakistan) behind the cause of independence framed by a secular, pluralistic 
nationalism. India entered the post-independence period with an immense advantage in that 
the idea of an Indian nation had already been internalised by ordinary Indians across the 
subcontinent. The INC had carefully structured its own movement—with linguistically-based 
regional units, for instance—and its ideology to bring as many Indians into its movement as 
possible. The case of Lebanon, on the other hand, represents a revolution from above that did 
not produce any meaningful “we-feeling” by the time that independence was achieved in 
1943. As Stepan, Linz, and Yadav remind us, securing democracy in diverse societies is never 
simply “a matter of designing or redesigning institutions; an expansion of democratic 
imagination must deal directly with ideas, ideals, and images.”161 India’s success in uniting its 
diverse population behind a common identity built on inclusive narratives, symbols, and 
ideals—and Lebanon’s failure to do so—goes a long way in explaining the difference in 
outcomes between the two countries. Indeed, one could argue that all the competing 
nationalisms in Lebanon were, despite their façade of non-sectarianism, ploys of sectarian 
one-upmanship that would never gain enough popular support across sectarian divides. And 
as we have seen, many of these identity-based dynamics go back to the colonial era and 
proved stubbornly resilient after independence, leading to vastly different outcomes.  
That was not to say that India was destined to succeed once independence had been 
achieved. As Kaviraj reminds us, nations are imagined communities with nothing objective 
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about them. If they can be imagined into existence, they can just as easily fall apart and 
disappear under changing circumstances.162 That India benefited from a handsome inheritance 
from the pre-independence period did not mean that India’s leaders would not squander that 
inheritance with policies that would harm, rather than promote, Indian unity. By adopting a 
secular constitution that did not distinguish citizens based on their religion—something 
inherent in the Lebanese model—that created a layered federal system to reflect layered 
regional/religious and national identities, and by not defining the state/nation in exclusive 
terms (i.e., Hindu, Hindi-speaking, etc.), India’s first generation of post-independence leaders 
preserved the solid foundation left by the independence movement. It is also crucial to note 
that the India’s success was not the result of a precise plan formulated before independence 
that was implemented without modification. Some of India’s most successful state-nation 
policies, such as the linguistic reorganisation of states and making English and Hindi 
permanently co-official, came from below rather than above. INC leaders like Nehru deserve 
credit for their pluralistic vision, but they also deserve credit for when they responded to the 
wishes of the people, even when doing so went against their own instincts, such as when 
Nehru bowed to public pressure to start the state reorganisation process in 1953.  
The differing trajectories of Lebanon and India also underline the importance of 
institutional choices. If India, as we have seen, adopted a series of policies and institutional 
choices that fostered layered, complementary identities, Lebanon did the opposite. 
Admittedly, many Lebanese thought that there was no alternative to the system of 
confessionalism in order to alleviate sectarian insecurities and give all sects a stake in the 
state, which underlines how little trust and sense of commonality existed between Lebanon’s 
sects. Yet as Elaine Hagopian observes, instead of alleviating those divides and creating a 
complementary Lebanese supra-identity over sectarian divisions, confessionalism “formalised 
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a number of sectarian nations within one state… Although the founders of the National Pact 
claimed that it would be a stage leading to the formation of a secular Lebanese nationalist 
state, the very structure it created froze Lebanon into sectarian identities and mini-nations.”163 
Lebanese confessionalism bought thirty years of peace—excluding the 1958 crisis—and 
created a state defined by political openness, (qualified) religious pluralism, respect for civil 
liberties, regular elections, and economic success, a success that sets Lebanon apart from 
every other Middle Eastern country. Yet the hollow foundations upon which the Lebanese 
state was built, coupled with a political system that froze fault lines in place rather than 
diminishing them, eventually caused the entire edifice to crumble.  
If the cases of Lebanon and India show us the importance of institutional choices in 
building successful state-nations, they also show the importance of political parties and 
coalitions. In the INC, India benefited from a party that appealed simultaneously to the 
masses and to the elites and to Indians regardless of ethnolinguistic or religious identity. If a 
big-tent party that included progressives like Nehru alongside conservative Hindus, it did 
have enough ideological coherence to implement a truly national political programme that 
brought together Indians regardless of class, caste, language, or faith. The situation in 
Lebanon could not have been more different. Lebanon did not have real political parties. To 
the extent that parties existed on paper, these parties only acted as fronts for families of 
zu’ama within each sect, producing Lebanon’s stunningly ideology-free political landscape.164 
The zu’ama exhibited parasitic behaviour, transforming themselves into indispensable 
intermediaries between the state and members of their own sect. They fostered vertical 
structures of patronage that accentuated the salience of sectarian identity rather than 
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horizontal social structures that would foster a sense of common community between 
members of different sects.  
In the first decades after independence, Lebanon and India continued down the same 
paths as they had before independence, with massively different outcomes for each country. 
India built a state that fostered the layering of identities that had first begun during the Indian 
independence movement, with a pluralistic Indian national identity complimenting Indian 
citizens’ other religious and ethnic affiliations. The Nehruvian vision of an Indian nation 
united by its diversity had now been etched into the structures of the Indian state, ensuring 
that Indians continued to feel Indian even once the common opponent that had united them in 
the first place, the British Raj, had disappeared. In Lebanon, elite bargaining produced a 
tenuous understanding based on mutual interest at a particular moment in time. In light of 
regional political changes and internal demographic changes, however, the interests of 
Lebanon’s various sects changed, pushing one part of the country to cling to the status quo as 
the other part sought to overturn the status quo because of their increased bargaining strength. 
When the Lebanese confessional system finally broke apart in 1975, it underscored that while 
Lebanon existed as a state, it did not exist as an imagined political community deeply 
ingrained in the minds of its citizens. However, to fully consider the overall success of both 
India and Lebanon, it is also important to look at how their political systems have held up in 
more recent decades. 
Part III: Enduring Legacies 
India: New challenges 
 Since Nehru’s death, several events have called into question India’s state-nation 
status: ethnic insurgencies and revolts in parts of the country, as well as increasing tensions 
between India’s Hindu majority and Muslim minority. It is also true that many states on 
India’s periphery—including Punjab, Mizoram, and Nagaland—have been shaken by 
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separatist insurgencies over the past six decades. Between 1980 and 1995, around 20,000 died 
in a separatist insurgency in Punjab, while Nagaland and Mizoram witnessed decades-long 
insurgencies against the Indian state.165 We will examine these cases before turning to the 
uniquely challenging case of Kashmir, as well as the rise of Hindu nationalism in India from 
the 1990s to the present.  
Nagaland and Mizoram 
The cases of Nagaland and Mizoram are worth looking at because of just how 
different both regions are from the rest of India. Located in the mountainous frontier region 
separating India and Burma, and home to many tribal ethnic groups with very little in 
common with the rest of India, both states were governed under special provisions during 
British rule. The INC had never operated in the region before independence.166 Both regions 
were attached to the larger state of Assam at the time of independence. Separatist movements 
in Nagaland in the 1950s and in Mizoram by the early 1960s resulted in the birth of decades-
long insurgencies.  
Bowing to pressure, the central government broke Mizoram away from Assam in 
1972, creating a new union territory.167 With a comprehensive peace agreement with the Mizo 
National Front (MNF), the main separatist group, in 1986, Mizoram became a full state with 
certain special autonomous privileges and the insurgency ended. Since then, the MNF and the 
INC emerged as the two dominant political parties in the state and have routinely rotated in 
and out of power. Today Mizoram is arguably one of the most peaceful states in Northeast 
India.168   
Nagaland, on the other hand, was also broken away from Assam to become its own 
state in 1962, and yet the insurgency in Nagaland has lasted far longer than that of Mizoram. 
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Nagaland has much more internal diversity than Mizoram—the largest linguistic group in 
Nagaland only makes up 13 per cent of the population—and also had several separatist 
groups. In contrast, Mizoram, which is far more ethnically homogeneous, had only one major 
separatist group. Unlike in Mizoram, the Indian government could never placate all of the 
groups in Nagaland at once, leading to a continued low-level insurgency.169 An additional 
issue is that a state uniting all Nagas in one state would have to come at the expense of 
territory in the neighbouring states of Arunachal Pradesh and Manipur. Nevertheless, while 
insurgent groups still do exist, violence resulting from separatist groups has almost entirely 
dissipated in recent years.170 Yet the fact that India has been able to largely integrate 
Nagaland and Mizoram—regions with few cultural and linguistic ties with the rest of India 
where the Indian independence movement was not active—testifies to the overall strength of 
India’s state-nation policies that have integrated even those not necessarily predisposed to 
identify as Indian into the Indian state and nation. 
Punjab 
 For the first three decades after independence, Punjab—the country’s only Sikh-
majority state—was a relatively well-integrated part of the Indian state. The roots of armed 
conflict in Punjab began with the Emergency, when Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, the 
daughter of Nehru, suspended the constitution and civil liberties and ruled by decree between 
1975 and 1977. In 1977, when Indira Gandhi ended the Emergency and called elections, she 
lost to a motley coalition of parties untied united only by their opposition to Indira Gandhi. 
One of the member parties of that coalition was the Akali Dal, a Sikh Punjabi regionalist 
party. In 1980, when Indira Gandhi returned to power following new elections, she dismissed 
the Akali Dal-led government in Punjab and imposed central government rule. While the 
Akali Dal had been previously led by moderates pushing for more regional autonomy, the 
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actions of Indira Gandhi pushed many Punjabis into the arms of extremists who were calling 
for the creation of an independent Sikh-majority country called Khalistan in Punjab. 
Separatist militants eventually occupied the Golden Temple, the holiest site in Sikhism, in 
Amritsar. In 1984, the Indian military drove the militants out of the temple, killing the leader 
of the Khalistan movement, Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale. In retaliation, two of Indira Gandhi’s 
Sikh bodyguards assassinated her, provoking a wave of anti-Sikh riots in Delhi.171  
By the early 1990s, however, with a more conciliatory government in Delhi, the 
moderate faction of the Akali Dal witnessed a resurgence and swept the 1997 state elections. 
Since then, the INC and the Akali Dal have regularly rotated in and out of power in the state, 
and a clear majority of Punjabis once again express a “great deal” or “some” confidence in the 
central government according to opinion polls.172 The past several decades of Punjabi politics 
have shown that when the central government respects the principles of federalism and works 
with moderate autonomist movements instead of suppressing them, there is no reason for 
regional identities to necessarily prevent identification with the Indian state and a larger 
Indian nation.  
While the challenges to India’s status as a state-nation have receded in Punjab, 
Mizoram, and Nagaland, there remains one region that has not ceased to call into question 
India’s credentials both as a democracy and a state-nation: Kashmir. 
India’s Kashmiri quagmire 
 No region of India has a more conflictual relationship with the Indian government than 
Jammu and Kashmir. Unlike the three previously discussed states, Jammu and Kashmir has 
had a deeply problematic relationship with the rest of India for the entire period since 
independence. At the time of independence, India’s princely states, which were effectively 
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local vassals of the British Raj, could choose to either accede to Pakistan or India. With the 
exception of Kashmir, all princely states eventually chose the logical state, with Muslim-
majority states bordering Pakistani territory choosing Pakistan and Hindu-majority states 
bordering Indian territory choosing India. Kashmir had a Muslim majority and bordered 
Pakistan, and yet it also bordered India and its ruler, Hari Singh, was Hindu. Hari Singh 
attempted to prevaricate after independence, not acceding to either India or Pakistan. 
Nevertheless, he agreed to sign the instrument of accession to India a couple of months after 
Indian independence in exchange for Indian military support against Pakistani-supported 
militants who were advancing on the capital, Srinagar, threatening to overthrow him. At the 
same time, Shiekh Abdullah, the Muslim leader of the Jammu and Kashmir National 
Conference and the most popular political leader in Kashmir, opposed joining Pakistan and 
indicated his inclination towards joining a secular India.173  
Nehru referred the issue to the UN Security Council, explicitly asking for UN 
assistance in holding a plebiscite that would allow the people of Kashmir to determine 
whether they wished to stay in India or not. This was, however, conditional upon the 
withdrawal of the invading militants, something which did not happen because Pakistan held 
onto most of the regions seized by the militants.174 Fearing an unfavourable outcome for 
India, Nehru reneged on his promise to allow for Kashmiri self-determination, and a plebiscite 
has still yet to be held today. Sheikh Abdullah, who became prime minister of Jammu and 
Kashmir after independence, became increasingly disillusioned with India and Nehru in the 
early 1950s. This led Nehru to engineer his removal from power and his imprisonment in 
1953 when fears grew that he would lead a separatist movement against India.175 He spent 
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much of the next two decades in prison and only returned to power in 1975 and remained in 
office until his death in 1982.  
Until 2019, Jammu and Kashmir theoretically enjoyed a degree of autonomy not given 
to any other state in India under Article 370 of the Indian constitution, with the central 
government only able to apply laws in Kashmir relating to foreign affairs, communications, 
and defence. In practice, however, Kashmir has been subject to a level of interference from 
the central government not seen in any other state in the country.176 Until 2002, there were no 
reasonably free or fair elections in Jammu and Kashmir except for the 1977 elections that 
returned Sheikh Abdullah to power. Civil and political rights have been repeatedly restricted, 
and the central government has shown little respect for democratically elected governments in 
the state. Unlike in the other states examined in the previous section, a clear majority of 
Kashmiris today favour independence from India.177  
Kashmir witnessed a particularly violent insurgency in the 1990s following the rigging 
of the 1987 state elections against the Muslim United Front, an electoral coalition of pro-
autonomy parties. As in Punjab, the subversion of the democratic process by the Indian state 
helped push ordinary people into the arms of extremists. The 1990s Kashmiri insurgency 
brought a large military presence to the state, and Indian troops stationed in Kashmir were 
accused of torture, rape, and extrajudicial killings during the height of the fighting.178 It is 
little wonder that so few Kashmiris can identify with India despite the fact that Kashmir has 
stronger historical ties to the rest of India than regions like Mizoram or Nagaland.  
Relative stability returned to Kashmir in the 2000s, and the state has held a series of 
relatively free, open elections since then. That progress was jeopardised by the abrogation of 
Article 370 in 2019 by the Hindu nationalist government of Narendra Modi and his Bharatiya 
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Janata Party (BJP). The repeal of Article 370 was followed by the partition of the state of 
Jammu and Kashmir into two union territories with far less autonomy and control over 
internal affairs. The de facto lack of autonomy from which Kashmir had suffered for decades, 
even under INC governments, thus became de jure under a government led by the INC’s 
Hindu nationalist opponents.179 The government also instituted a months-long internet 
blackout that became the longest ever seen in a democracy. The central government also 
arrested leading Kashmiri politicians who might have been capable of mounting a campaign 
of opposition to the central government’s fait accompli.180  
India has clearly not lived up to its democratic ideals in Kashmir. The question is then 
whether India’s behaviour in Kashmir represents a failure of the state-nation model. Since 
independence, the Indian state has behaved in an entirely different way in Kashmir than it has 
in the rest of the country. The basic requirements of state-nation policies—such as respect for 
regional autonomist parties, a functioning tiered federal system, fair elections, and basic 
respect for civil and political liberties—have not been practised in Kashmir as they have been 
in the rest of India. As Stepan, Linz, and Yadav observe, “it is less analytically accurate to 
conclude that state-nation policies have ‘failed’ in Jammu and Kashmir than it is to conclude 
that they could never be systematically applied.”181 Although the repeal of Section 370 and 
Kashmir’s partition and demotion to a union territory represent particularly egregious 
violations of state-nation policies, Kashmir’s autonomy has been flouted by governments in 
Delhi led by both the INC and the BJP.182  
Because of its status as the only Muslim-majority region of India, as well as a region 
that should have gone to Pakistan according to the logic of partition, Kashmir has enormous 
symbolic value for both India and Pakistan. The fact that the fate of Kashmir is about much 
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more than Kashmir itself perhaps explains why India has not felt secure enough to let the 
people of Kashmir freely express themselves in a plebiscite on the status of the region. It also 
explains why the Indian state has moved to stifle any movement that could potentially lead 
Kashmir to break away from India. Yet if Kashmir represents a localised manifestation of 
India’s troubled Hindu-Muslim tensions, how well has India performed regarding Hindu-
Muslim relations at the polity-wide level? 
The rise of Hindu nationalism 
Since the 1990s, the greatest threat to India’s status as a state-nation has not come 
from linguistic tensions: India’s federal system and linguistic states have actually continued to 
be a unifying force, even with the explosion of regional parties at the expense of larger 
national parties like the INC. Instead, the ghosts of pre-partition Hindu-Muslim tensions have 
reappeared, threatening to undermine the idea of equal citizenship and the pluralistic national 
fabric built by the Indian independence movement. While Gandhi and Nehru’s secular 
nationalism had seemed to win the ideological battle at the time of independence, Hindu 
nationalism has seen a revival since the late 1980s, posing a serious challenge to the idea of a 
pluralistic Indian nationalism and a secular Indian state.  
Hindu nationalism had long existed alongside the Nehruvian-Gandhian secular version 
of Indian nationalism, as discussed in previous sections. In the aftermath of partition, the 
ideological offspring of thinkers like Savarkar and Golwalkar were a minor presence in Indian 
politics. The grip of the INC seemed uncontested for nearly four decades. The only defeat the 
INC suffered was in 1977, when Indira Gandhi was ousted after the end of the Emergency by 
a motley coalition of anti-Indira forces, known as the Janata Party, that included a small 
number of Hindu nationalists. The anti-Indira coalition fell apart in 1980, returning Indira 
Gandhi to power in that year’s elections. The Hindu nationalist party that emerged in 1980 
from the ashes of the Janata Party, the Bharatiya Janata Party, only won two seats in the 1984 
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elections that returned INC to power with over 80% of the seats in parliament. Just over a 
decade later, the BJP was asked to form a government after winning a plurality of seats in the 
1996 general elections. How the BJP and its ideology became so popular remains a topic of 
debate.  
There are a variety of explanations for the rise of the BJP, and the truth is most likely 
some combination of these competing theories. One view is simply that after decades of 
socialist, secular politics under the increasingly corrupt INC, India was bound to look for an 
alternative, especially after the polarising rule of Indira Gandhi and her usurpation of 
democracy during the Emergency. Factors such as the Mandal Commission, which 
recommended the expansion of caste-based reservations, did much to anger many middle-
class Hindus as well. Additionally, the INC’s secularism had started to appear to some Hindus 
as mere pandering to minority communities.  In particular, however, the BJP seized on the 
Shah Bano case, when the INC legislatively undid a Supreme Court ruling regarding Muslim 
divorce laws, as an example of the INC’s habit of appeasing Muslims who (according to the 
BJP) thought themselves worthy of special and deferential treatment.183 More broadly, the 
BJP’s mix of pro-liberalisation economic policies and political Hinduism spoke to the 
ambitions and anxieties of the growing (mostly upper-caste) Hindu middle class that exploded 
after India’s economic opening in the early 1990s.184 Yet although the BJP’s rise resulted 
from the confluence of different factors, there was one particular event that catapulted the BJP 
to national prominence.  
In 1992, after several years of agitation, Hindu nationalists affiliated with the BJP 
finally destroyed a historic mosque, the Babri Masjid, built during the Mughal Empire in the 
city of Ayodhya. Hindu nationalists claimed that the mosque was built on the birthplace of the 
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Hindu deity Ram and that a temple dedicated to Ram should be built where the mosque stood. 
The destruction of the mosque triggered a wave of communal violence across India that killed 
thousands. For the BJP, however, the destruction of the Babri Masjid was a boon to its 
electoral prospects. In the 1996 general elections, it ousted the INC-led government of 
Narasimha Rao and emerged as the largest party in parliament with 161 seats, a major 
improvement on the mere two seats it had won little over a decade before. While the BJP 
formed a government that only lasted two weeks in 1996, it gained seats again in the 1998 
elections and remained in power until 2004.185 
In 2002, while the BJP was in power in Delhi, it was also in power in the western state 
of Gujarat. When a train carrying Hindu pilgrims back from Ayodhya to Gujarat was lit on 
fire, a wave of anti-Muslim violence broke out throughout the state. Ramachandra Guha 
describes riots that “were unprecedented in their savagery. Muslim shops and offices were 
attacked, mosques torched, and cars vandalized. Muslim women were raped. Muslim men 
were killed, and bonfires were made of their bodies.” Over 2,000 Muslims died during the 
violence, and more than 100,000 were rendered homeless.186 The chief minister of Gujarat at 
that time, the future prime minister Narendra Modi, has been dogged by accusations that he 
and his government sat back and let the killing occur or even provided some assistance to the 
rioters.  
The cloud over the conduct of Modi’s government did not prevent the voters of 
Gujarat from voting Modi back into office for another term that December. Writing just after 
the 2002 Gujarat legislative elections, Ashutosh Varshney wrote that “Gujarat’s electorate has 
legitimized independent India’s first unambiguous pogrom, a pogrom much more vicious than 
the killings of the Sikhs in Delhi in 1984, a pogrom that came closest to the classic, anti-
Jewish pogroms of Russia and Europe in the late 19th and the first half of the 20th 
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century.”187 In 2014, just over a decade after the 2002 riots, Modi nevertheless became prime 
minister following a landslide victory for the BJP that ousted the INC after a decade in power 
in Delhi. Modi was re-elected by an even larger margin in 2019. 
The threat that Modi and Hindu nationalism pose to India’s future as a state-nation are 
very real. Even before Modi’s election as prime minister, Stepan, Linz, and Yadav warned 
that “if the Gujarat model became a dominant model in India, this would bring about the 
sociopolitical destruction of India’s state-nation.”188 Moreover, a state-nation is not something 
that is simply built once and is self-sustaining. Rather, it needs to be maintained through 
continued adherence to state-nation policies. They note that like nation-states, “a state-nation 
is also a politically imagined community that needs to be sustained through continuous 
contestation and re-creation in the realm of ideas, institutions, and political practices.”189  
A combination of events introduced in Modi’s second term could pave the way for 
Indian Muslims who cannot provide documentation to lose their citizenship. The government 
announced its intention to establish a National Register of Citizens (NRC), requiring Indians 
to provide documents to prove that they were born in India. At the same time, parliament 
passed the Citizenship (Amendment) Act (CAA), providing followers of all South Asian 
religions except Islam with a path to obtain citizenship if they cannot provide the necessary 
documentation to be included in the National Register of Citizens. The result of these two 
actions in combination could result in millions of Indian Muslims losing their citizenship and 
becoming stateless. Hindu nationalists feel increasingly emboldened, with one spokesman for 
the Vishwa Hindu Parishad, an affiliate of the BJP, echoing Golwalkar by proclaiming openly 
that Muslims and other non-Hindus “have to be subservient to Hindus and Hinduism” in 
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India.190 Modi’s second term has also seen a surge in hate crimes against Muslims throughout 
the country.191 On the other side, the BJP’s laws created a furore that spurred a months-long 
wave of protests across the country.192  
What happens in the coming years will be enormously consequential for the survival 
of India as a pluralistic state-nation. India’s foundation as a state-nation is providing at least 
some buffer against the BJP’s Hindu majoritarianism, as demonstrated by the unprecedented 
wave of protests against the CAA and the NRC. The protests, which caught the BJP off guard, 
proved that the Gandhian-Nehruvian pluralistic vision of India is still very much alive and 
will not disappear quietly. Yet the astonishing success of Hindu nationalism poses troubling 
questions about how deep the pluralistic “we-feeling” inclusive of Muslims ever was, even 
during the years of Nehru and Indira Gandhi. Modi’s popularity also calls into question the 
ultimate success of the vision espoused by Nehru and Gandhi, as well as whether their model 
will continue to be the normative model of Indian nationalism and politics going forward. The 
conflict between the two competing visions of India, a conflict that has continued in one form 
or another for over a century, will determine to what extent India will remain a state-nation in 
the future.  
Lebanon after the civil war: Superficial changes 
The Lebanese Civil War largely ended in 1989 with the signing of the Ta’if 
Agreement by the surviving members of the pre-civil war parliament. The agreement is as 
notable for what it changed in Lebanon’s political system as for what it did not change. 
Recognising that Lebanon’s confessional system was in large part responsible for the civil 
war, the constitution was modified to state that the abolition of confessionalism would be a 
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“basic national goal,” while conveniently not setting out a plan or a date for phasing out 
confessionalism. The agreement also called for a new electoral law abolishing sectarian 
quotas in parliament as well as the appointment of government officials based on qualification 
and competency rather than religious identity. Additionally, the agreement called for the 
creation of an upper house where religious communities would be represented proportionate 
to their share of the population. All of these provisions have yet to be implemented, and the 
confessional system and unicameral parliament remain in place. The agreement also did not 
change the composition of the troika of the Maronite president, Sunni prime minister, and 
Shi’a speaker. Instead, many of the president’s powers were transferred to the prime minister, 
and the Shi’a were given a de facto increase in power when Hizballah alone was exempted 
from the disarmament of militias at the end of the war. The 6:5 Christian advantage in 
parliamentary seats was reduced to a 1:1 ratio.  
While the Ta’if Agreement brought peace to Lebanon, it did little to solve the 
underlying causes of the civil war. Instead of bringing about a true reconciliation and honest 
discussion of the mistakes of the pre-war period, the Ta’if Agreement only provided a 
negative peace that perpetuated the very system that was at the root of the conflict.193 
Although the agreement explicitly acknowledged the need to do away with confessionalism, it 
ended up reinforcing it.194  
Indeed, one could argue that the civil war had made Lebanon even more divided. 
Despite the return of peace, the joint collapse of the economy and the state for over a decade 
had only served to strengthen the importance of religious group solidarity. The post-civil war 
political scene was also dominated by former sectarian warlords who became politicians once 
again. The main actors in the Lebanese political scene were the same sectarian militias that 
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had plunged the country into conflict for over a decade, and there were almost no political 
parties or civil society groups whose memberships crossed religious divides.195 
 The Ta’if Agreement also gave Syria a justification to continue to interfere in 
Lebanese politics. Although no Lebanese faction definitively won the civil war, Syria was the 
true winner of the conflict. Intervening first in 1976, Syria had come to occupy the vast 
majority of Lebanese territory by the end of the war, strategically helping different sides while 
increasing its own power in the country. The Ta’if Agreement reflected that almost all 
factions had accepted the reality of Syrian occupation, and the agreement even legitimated the 
indefinite prolongation of a Syrian military presence in Lebanon. After the war, Damascus 
used its military and intelligence apparatus to muzzle journalists, fill the government with 
allies, and cripple all opposition to its occupation in what was known as the Pax Syriana. The 
Ta’if Agreement legitimated the continued presence of Syrian forces in Lebanon, and Syria 
conditioned its eventual withdrawal on the abolition of confessionalism. In reality, this meant 
that Syria would remain in Lebanon indefinitely, as it was obvious that confessionalism 
would not be phased out at any point in the near future.196 Indeed, Syria used the continued 
sectarian divisions in Lebanon to justify its occupation as a peacekeeping mission to 
neutralise the possibility of another war.197 
 There has been small, fragile progress to a post-sectarian Lebanon. In 2005, the 
assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, orchestrated by Syria and Hizballah, 
brought a million Lebanese to protest against Syrian interference in Lebanon, leading to the 
withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon several months later. Hariri had objected to the 
illegal extension of the term of President Émile Lahoud, a close ally of Damascus, the 
previous year, resigning as prime minister in protest. The protests against the assassination of 
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Hariri brought Lebanese of all religious confessions together in an unprecedented show of 
national unity and support for Lebanese sovereignty that became known as the Cedar 
Revolution.198 Even then, however, sectarian politics were never entirely absent, as both of 
the main Shi’a parties, Amal and Hizballah, defended the Syrian presence in Lebanon. 
Although Syria withdrew its forces from Lebanon after the Cedar Revolution, Hizballah has 
continued to hold the rest of Lebanon hostage with Syrian support in the years since the Cedar 
Revolution. Hizballah unilaterally drew Lebanon into a disastrous 2006 war with Israel and 
took over much of the country during a 2008 political crisis, surrounding the homes of anti-
Hizballah politicians and neutralising their security forces. The 2008 crisis eventually ended 
with the election of army chief Michel Sleiman as a consensus candidate for president. Still, 
the episode underscored the fact that Lebanon remains as internally divided as ever, with 
religious factions willing to cause the state to implode to advance their own interests. 
Hizballah again used its weight in 2011 to bring down a government led by Rafiq Hariri’s 
son, Saad, in an attempt to block continued funding for the UN-backed investigation into 
Hariri’s murder.199 Even over a decade after the events of 2008, Hizballah remains the most 
powerful force in Lebanon, with capabilities beyond those of the Lebanese military.200 With 
external actors like Syria and Iran continuing to exert influence through local clients like 
Hizballah who are looking for leverage against opposing factions and religious sects, it is 
questionable whether Lebanon ever truly became independent again after its civil war. As 
local factions continue to turn to external patrons to gain an advantage over their local 
Lebanese rivals, Lebanon is today what Tom Najem calls a “penetrated state” with a dubious 
degree of sovereignty or internal cohesion.201  
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In more recent years, there have been increasing signs of dissatisfaction with the 
Lebanese confessional system. As we have seen, the confessional system allows certain 
groups to hold the country hostage. In 2015, one such incident led to the suspension of waste 
collection services, leading the streets of Beirut to become inundated with garbage. Protests 
against the government erupted, and the protest movement led to the formation of a  non-
sectarian civil society coalition focused on good governance, Beirut Madinati, to contest the 
2016 municipal elections. While it did not win, Beirut Madinati’s solid performance paved the 
way for a civil society candidate, Paula Yacoubian, to win a seat from East Beirut in the 2018 
parliamentary elections, defeating candidates from lists backed by the zu’ama. While one seat 
out of 128 is not much, there are growing signs of dissatisfaction with the zu’ama and their 
disastrous type of politics Another wave of protests erupted in October 2019 in response to 
the inability of the government to provide basic services as well as major tax hikes during a 
fiscal crisis. Many protesters called for removing the zu’ama from office and the end of the 
confessional system that had allowed them to thrive for so many decades, becoming 
fantastically wealthy while keeping the state too weak to provide services to Lebanese 
citizens.202 While the protests did not immediately lead to the ouster of the zu’ama, the 
emergence of popular movements challenging the zu’ama and confessionalism over the past 
decade is at least a small reason for optimism.  
Part IV: Lessons and Implications 
What lessons do India and Lebanon have to offer? 
Both India and Lebanon were founded on an idea of creating unity from diversity. As 
we can see, however, the paths each county took were considerably different from each other, 
even as they wrestled with similar questions. India, while far more successful than Lebanon, 
finds its state-nation under threat from a powerful Hindu nationalist movement opposed to the 
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pluralistic and secular ideals of India’s founders. Lebanon, meanwhile, has yet to overcome 
the lack of national cohesion that caused the country’s civil war. Looking back at both cases, 
what are the overall lessons and implications of Lebanon and India’s attempts at building 
diverse democracies?  
1. Pre-independence legacies matter 
India benefited from its pre-independence history, while Lebanon suffered from it. 
India’s independence movement created a sense of national unity that, while originally aimed 
against the British, proved powerful enough to hold the diverse peoples of India together after 
independence. Through mass participation in an independence movement expressly designed 
to respect Indians’ other salient identities, people began to imagine themselves as Indians as 
much as they would imagine themselves as members of particular ethnolinguistic or religious 
communities. The Indian independence movement was also led and framed by leaders like 
Gandhi and Nehru who sought to construct an identity and a narrative of Indian history 
emphasising that India’s very unity was in its diversity. While this did not in any way 
guarantee the success of India as a state-nation after independence, it did provide an 
invaluable foundation for India’s political leaders to work with after independence. 
Lebanon, on the other hand, achieved independence with a much hollower foundation. 
A small Lebanon with an overwhelming Christian majority would have been economically 
unviable, leading Maronite leaders to successfully push for the addition of many Muslim 
regions to form Greater Lebanon. Approximately half of Lebanon’s population at 
independence thus resented having been drawn into the borders of Lebanon, a state that they 
believed had no historical legitimacy. Pre-independence politics in Lebanon also resembled 
an elite-based consociational system, with Christian elites trying to obtain buy-in from their 
(mostly Sunni) Muslim counterparts and elites on all sides claiming to act on behalf of other 
members of their religious sect. In contrast to the mass mobilisation of the Indian 
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independence movement, average Lebanese citizens did not have a common experience to 
forge a shared national consciousness before the end of the French mandate. Lebanon’s 
political system, designed by and for elites, would thus survive only so long as elites from 
both sides felt that it was in their interest to cooperate with the other side. When that ceased to 
be the case, there was no sense of shared Lebanese identity to prevent Lebanon’s various sects 
from turning on each other. 
The decades before independence in each country set Lebanon and India down paths 
that were difficult to deviate from. The legacy of the late colonial period thus worked to the 
benefit of India and to the detriment of Lebanon.  
2. Proper institutional design is necessary but not sufficient for the survival of a state-nation 
 While Lebanon and India started down different paths before independence, neither 
state deviated from its path in the years after independence. While India consolidated its status 
as achieved most of the characteristics of a state-nation in the first few decades after 
independence, Lebanon went down a different route by doubling down on its confessional 
model.  
 As we have seen, India benefited from a stronger sense of national identity and 
cohesion at the time of independence. Yet India’s first generation of post-independence 
leaders also deserve credit for not squandering that sense of shared Indianness, especially 
since Indians could no longer unite around their opposition to British colonial rule.  
First, India refused to give in to the logic of two-nation theory according to which 
Pakistan was to be a state for Muslims and India a state for Hindus. Instead, the framers of 
India’s constitution emphasised that India was equally home to all of its religious 
communities and created a secular state that would guarantee equal freedoms and rights to 
followers of all faiths in India. In doing so, they reaffirmed the pluralistic national vision of 
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figures like Nehru and Gandhi and made it possible for Hindus and Muslims alike to see 
themselves as equally part of the Indian nation.  
Additionally, India’s leaders ensured that speakers of all of India’s languages could 
feel equally part of India by ultimately acceding to popular demands to make English and 
Hindi permanently co-official. Additionally, the creation of linguistic states is another major 
achievement of India’s state-nation experiment. Linguistic federalism allows for the 
expression of regional linguistic identities within the framework of the larger Indian state. As 
Ramachandra Guha points out, the “creation of linguistic states has acted as a largely 
constructive channel for provincial pride. It has proved quite feasible to be peaceably 
Kannadiga—or Tamil, or Oriya—as well as contentedly Indian.”203 In a sense, the tiered 
nature of Indian federalism reflects how India is conceived of as a nation, with an Indian 
national identity layered above regional ethnolinguistic identities. India’s linguistic federalism 
has been so successful that it is now considered a model to copy in countries with similar 
internal diversity.204 
India’s institutional choices thus made it possible for Indians to identify with India 
both as a nation and a state regardless of their religion or mother tongue. Through these 
institutional choices, there was no conflict between identifying as Tamil or Bengali and Indian 
at the same time. The same was not true for Tamils of Sri Lanka or Bengalis in Pakistan, who 
both ended up launching violent secessionist revolts against their respective governments. 
India’s success is a reminder that the right institutional choices, supported by an inclusive 
national identity, can hold vastly different groups together peacefully in the same state. Even 
more encouragingly, India has been able to successfully integrate areas like Mizoram that did 
not even participate in the independence movement.  
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India thus achieved all the major foundations of a state-nation: a layering of 
complementary identities, state support for multiple cultural identities (both linguistic and 
religious), a strong federal system, and the ability for regional autonomist movements to work 
within the framework of the larger state, often entering into coalitions with larger national 
parties.  
 If Lebanon’s pre-independence politics were inauspicious, its post-independence 
institutional choices were equally as harmful to the country’s prospects of becoming a stable 
state-nation. The National Pact, as we have seen, placed a bandage over the conflict around 
Lebanon’s national identity, promoting a compromise vision that was not really acceptable to 
either side. While India made accommodations for its minority communities, it never 
compromised the idea of secular citizenship like Lebanon did. In India, except for limited 
caste-based reservations, all citizens are still equal in rights and duties regardless of their other 
identities. In Lebanon, on the other hand, citizens exist only through their religious affiliation, 
and their rights are shaped and limited according to the religion to which they belong.  
While the confessional system might have given each religious group a stake in state 
power, it encouraged Lebanese to see themselves first as members of religious communities. 
The state did not represent the unity of the Lebanese people as much as it did a source of 
patronage for confessional elites to fight over, with elites pushing for a more advantageous 
arrangement for their community. Lebanon’s politicians ultimately did not care as much about 
the good of Lebanon as they did about the interests of their sect and access to patronage. The 
country ended up paying the price for the choices they made.  
The case of Lebanon reminds us that there are ways to regulate internal ethnic or 
religious divides that can be counterproductive, buying a period of peace at the price of 
reinforcing the very divisions that they are meant to alleviate. The National Pact was a 
temporary fix that covered up the underlying hollowness of Lebanon as both a state and a 
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nation. In fact, diagnosing the roots of Lebanon’s civil war presents a chicken-and-egg 
challenge, because Lebanon’s weak national identity and the institutions that kept Lebanese 
citizens dived were both mutually reinforcing. This is why, although the right institutional 
choices are necessary, they are not sufficient. To be viable, institutions must be supported by 
a well-established imagined political community and vice versa.  
3. State-nations can be undone 
In his last address before India’s constituent assembly, Ambedkar noted that the legal 
framework established by the constitution would not be enough to preserve India’s 
democracy. As he noted, “the constitution can provide only the organs of state such as the 
legislature, the executive and the judiciary. The factors on which the working of those organs 
of the state depend are the people and the political parties they will set up as their instruments 
to carry out their wishes and their politics. Who can say how the people of India and their 
parties will behave?”205 Ambedkar’s question, as we have seen, is as relevant as ever today.  
Much had to turn out exactly right for India’s state-nation to even exist in the first 
place. And while India’s state-nation seems as secure as ever on the linguistic front, the threat 
to religious pluralism in India is greater today than at any time since independence. Although 
the BJP has suffered a series of setbacks in recent state assembly elections that show that it is 
not invincible, Modi and his party are trying to remake the Indian state according to their own 
variety of Indian nationalism, a chauvinistic nationalism that places Hindus above all others. 
Should Hindu nationalism continue to gain traction at the expense of the pluralistic Gandhian-
Nehruvian Indian nationalism and state institutions be remade to reflect Hindu nationalist 
ideology, that would mean the end of India’s state-nation experiment. The fact that so many 
Indians, most of them not Muslim, have turned out in support of Indian secularism is a 
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heartening sign. Still, the situation is a reminder that like all political systems, state-nations 
will only survive if constantly maintained by politicians and voters.  
4. We-feelings matter    
Finally, the most important lesson that the cases of India and Lebanon offer is that, to 
borrow Stepan, Linz, and Yadav’s term, “we-feelings” matter a great deal in determining 
whether state-nations succeed or fail.  
Lebanon’s attempt at holding its constituent religious groups together in the 
framework of a democratic state was ultimately fatally undermined by the fact that the 
Lebanese did not see themselves as part of the same imagined political community. When 
faced with external threats to national security and sovereignty, Lebanon ended up coming 
apart rather than coming together precisely because many Lebanese were happy to side with 
outsiders against their fellow citizens to advance the interests of their own sect.  
The Lebanese model underlines the limits of elite-based consociational democracies. 
Lebanon did not adopt state-nation policies that would have led to a successful layering of 
identities. Instead, Lebanon’s leaders, the zu’ama, decided that it would be better to build a 
system built around competition for power among religious sects. While this might have made 
the zu’ama more secure in their positions as providers of protection and patronage, it did not 
foster the sense of oneness that India’s institutional arrangements did. The Lebanese 
consociational system worked well so long as the confessional elites thought it beneficial for 
themselves to work with each other. When they ceased to do so, as was the case in 1958 and 
1975, the system’s frailty showed itself and the state collapsed because its foundation—which 
should have been a deeply internalised sense of Lebanese patriotism—was hollow all along. 
Unlike India, Lebanon was never truly pluralistic. Instead, it would be more accurate to 
describe it as a mosaic of self-interested sects that did not care about the overall well-being of 
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Lebanon or other Lebanese.206 While Nehru saw an India united behind a sense of “common 
living and common purpose,” such a sentiment was manifestly absent in Lebanon.207 This is 
not to say that India’s history has been perfect. While the rise of Hindu nationalism shows that 
India’s state-nation is fragile, the fact that it has done so well for so long testifies to the 
strength of the foundation on which it was built.  
Lebanon never had figures like Gandhi, who rallied people across salient social 
divisions behind a common national project, or Nehru, who articulated an inclusive national 
history and vision that could then be used as the basis for building a state that promoted 
national cohesion. Nor did it have a truly national party like the INC that served as a vehicle 
for mass mobilisation and creating a sense of national unity across social divides. Instead, 
Lebanon was cursed with largely narrow-minded zu’ama who fostered vertical patronage 
networks at the expense of building horizontal social connections through a genuinely 
participatory democracy. The resulting lack of national unity that plagued Lebanon since 
independence goes a long way in explaining why India has been more successful as a state-
nation and a democracy.  
While both India and Lebanon rejected the idea of a homogeneous nation-state in 
favour of a more pluralistic model, only India can truly be classified as a state-nation. With its 
lower levels of national cohesion, a far weaker “we-feeling,” and a political system based on 
elite bargaining instead of cross-sectarian popular political movements, Lebanon’s attempt at 
managing its internal diversity resembles more closely the consociational democracy model 
proposed by Lijphart. Although recent events have called into question the future of India’s 
state-nation, the decades of history examined here suggest that India’s state-nation experiment 
offers a more sustainable and durable model for democratically managing diverse societies, a 
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model that recognises the importance of well-designed institutions supported by a deeply-felt 
and pluralistic national identity.  
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